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The Commission of the European Communities included a study on "The
Process of Integrating Slovenia and other Central and Eastern European
Countries into the European Economy" into its ACE programme in
September 1993. The study has been carried out by the Slovenian Institute
for Economic Research (Ljubljana), headed by Peter Stanovnik, as the
principal co-ordinator, by the University Libre (Brussels), in particular by
Henri Capron, and by the Institut fur Weltwirtschaft (Kiel), in particular by
Hans H. Glismann and Ernst-Jtirgen Horn.
This paper gives a presentation of the institutional issues that had to be dealt
with in the project; it was discussed at a workshop held in Ljubljana in June
1995. Thanks are due to the participants of the above mentioned workshop,
and most of all, to Ms. Renata Slabe and Ms. Valentina Prevolnik for
providing us with a comprehensive synopsis of the Slovenian transformation




Six main characteristics of an economic order are discussed and empirically
evaluated for the case of Slovenia. All of them pertain to the institutional
setting ab urbe condita; they comprise the legal and jurisdictional situation,
the role of private property, the institutionalised strive at competition among
firms and individuals, the liberty of markets, the solution of the big
assignment problem, and the approach to foreign-trade relations. All six
aspects impinge upon the conditions which confront investors in material
and in human capital in Slovenia.
The analysis shows that Slovenia has had, for three years now, by and large
the same problems that other countries in transition had. For example, it still
has, among others, tight regulations regarding foreign exchange transactions,
and a highly socialist property system burdened with too complicated
procedures of privatisation.
The authors conclude that in Slovenia, as in the other formerly socialist
economies, transformation should first and foremost aim at being coherent.
Secondly, first things should come first; the first thing would be to privatise.
With a proper approach of institutional reforms there should be no barrier to
achieving two-digit rates of real growth, just like Germany had after
transition into a market economy in 1949.
JEL-Classification: H 1, H 4, K 1, K 2, K 4, P 5.Ill
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References 131I. Introduction: The System of "Ordnungspolitik"
It must have been generations of economists from German-speaking
countries that have tried in vain to translate the term "Ordnungspolitik"
(which is to be distinguished from the "ProzeBpolitik") into proper English.
Only in recent years there has arisen a new branch of economics which is
called "institutional economics" (not: economics of institutions!). If this new
branch is concerned with the institutional environment of economic agents -
such as the law, the procedures, the allocation of powers, the macro-
economic assignment of tasks - and how to change this environment in
order to achieve certain goals, then the term "Ordnungspolitik" will have
found a correct translation at last.
In spite of the topics that we read about each and every day in the
newspapers and which, in 99 per cent of the cases, deal with "ProzeBpolitik"
the factors that make some countries rich/or grow fast and some countries
poor/or grow slowly are all of the "ordnungspolitische" kind. The fact that a
formerly developing country, such as Hong Kong, has economically (in
terms of per-capita income) surpassed Germany, let alone the Queen's own
country, indicates a superior "Ordnung" in Hong Kong. Similar reasoning
applies to in-country conditions: In Germany, for example, the mailing of a
letter is (much) more expensive than in any other country that we know of;
nonetheless, the German Post Company produces losses with each letter
mailed that would be considered nightmarish in other countries. The reason,
again, can be found in a traditionally mislead sectoral "Ordnungspolitik" in
Germany.
In short: "Ordnungspolitik" matters. In the following the (six) main aspects
of an economic order will be discussed and evaluated in the case ofSlovenia; all these aspects pertain to the institutional setting ab urbe con-
dita. The latter seems to have been achieved in May 1992, when Slovenia -
like other previous republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina)- was granted full UN
membership. 1
The six main aspects are
(1) The legal and jurisdictional situation,
(2) the role of private property,
(3) the institutionalised strive at competition among firms and individuals,
(4) the liberty of markets,
(5) the solution of the big assignment problem,
(6) the approach to foreign-trade relations.
As is easily understood, all six aspects impinge upon the conditions which
confront investors in material and in human capital in Slovenia.
Some basic information seems to be warranted to make outsiders - if not understand
but at least know - about the present formal status of the former Yugoslav republics:
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as it has chosen to call itself since April 1995,
comprises the two republics of Serbia and Montenegro. Macedonia declared itself a
sovereign state in November 1991 and was admitted to the UN in April 1993. Kosovo
became part of Serbia. The UN General Assembly voted to suspend Yugoslavia from
participation in its proceedings "until the new Yugoslav state had applied and been
accepted to fill the seat in the UN occupied by the former Yugoslavia" (The Europa
World Yearbook 1994, p. 4). Consequently, the diplomatic representation of
Yugoslavia is catalogued as being "vacant" (ibidem, p. 7).II. The Case of Slovenia
2
1. Some Remarks on the Approach Chosen to Assess Institutional
Reforms
A catalogue based on criteria for essential elements of a liberal market
economy seems helpful to analyse the approaches to and the results of the
reform process in Slovenia. These criteria include: legal base, state of
private property, competition rales, liberty of the markets, macroeconomic
assignment of responsibilities, and the openness of the economy. This
catalogue mainly serves two purposes. On the one hand, it defines an ideal
economic policy framework of a market economy. On the other hand, it can
be used as an instrument to determine the status quo of the reform
approaches. By comparing the ideal conditions of a market economy with
the reality existing in Slovenia it seems possible to identify reform deficits in
Slovenia and to develop adequate reform proposals.
2. Division of Power, Rule of Law, and Individual Contractual
Liberty
In a market economy the state offers a legal system as a public good which
is a pre-requisite to an efficient production of private goods. A market
system can only work if pursuance of economic activities is guaranteed by
law without any discrimination. For this purpose strong public authorities are
necessary which, however, have to be controlled in order to avoid political
arbitrariness. An effective protection against political arbitrariness can only
This chapter draws in large part on the results of a study prepared by Renata Slabe
and Katka Prevolnik which was commissioned in order to evaluate the details of
institutional reforms in Slovenia.be expected to be achieved if the constitutional order provides a separation
of power between the executive, legislative and jurisdictional functions of
government and the necessary checks and balances: The jurisdiction should
be independent from administrative and parliamentarian patronage, and it
should be guaranteed that administrative and legislative decisions can be
appealed at courts. The legal system must also guarantee the liberty of
private contracting which constitutes the essence of a market order. A
sanction mechanism is necessary to enforce contractual trust, i.e. public
goods in the form of a legal infrastructure and legal instruments are needed
to let the markets function properly.
The Basic Constitutional Charter of Slovenia (Official Journal of the RS,
1991, No. 33, The Constitution of the RS, pp. 1373-1386) defines the
democratic nature of the new state, recognises the rights and fundamental
liberties of its citizens, and lays down the principal of the separation of
power among the legislative, executive and jurisdictional branches of
government. An Audit Commission is assumed to be established as an in-
dependent institution in charge with controlling the state accounts, the state
budget and the entire public consumption. It has not been founded yet, but
preparations are going on. According to the current planning, the Audit
Commission will be independent and bound by the constitution and the law.
The Central Bank of Slovenia is independent from the executive branch of
government, but responsible to the State Assembly. The governor of the
Central Bank is appointed by the State Assembly.
All in all, it appears that Slovenia has by now introduced the fundamental
rules of the legal base necessary for a functioning market economy. There
are - in international comparison to western democracies - no extraordinary
legal constraints of individual liberty. The citizens are now entitled to takelegal steps even against public authorities. Contractual liberty of economic
agents is in principal warranted. And the rules of civil law provide, in
theory, the necessary legal incentives for contractors to perform their
contracts. It seems to be quite another question, however, to what extent the
reformation of the legal base (which has been of course a necessary pre-
condition for the transition process) has already been brought to shape the
reality of economic incentives and economic conduct in the Slovenian
economy. Some major issues in this context will be discussed in the
following.
3. The Property Question
Private property - especially that of real estate and of means of production -
is a necessary condition for an efficient resource allocation in an economy.
In a market economy, private property means that the proprietor has the
exclusive right to use and to transfer his property, and to realise returns on
his property, as provided and guaranteed by law. In addition, the stability of
the property rights structure must be ensured. Under such conditions, the
proprietor has incentives to allocate his property efficiently, and to spend
returns for the maintenance of his assets.
After World War II, the greatest part of private property in Slovenia had
been nationalised, and only a smaller part remained in the private and
cooperative ownership (craft workshops, forestry, and agriculture). With the
acceptance of the new constitution of Yugoslavia in 1974, the greatest part
of the state property was transformed into "socially-owned" property - as
the property of everybody and, at the same time, of nobody. Citizens had the
obligation to use, maintain and manage socially-owned property in the same
way as a good proprietor would have done it. Experience over time revealedthat such an ownership structure is economically totally ineffective. After its
independence, Slovenia started a transformation process from the socialist
"self-management system" towards a market-economy system, based on
private property and the abolishment of socially-owned property. Although
private property had in principal been allowed already in the past, its use
had been heavily regulated by the government, and its share in national
wealth had always been relatively small.
Privatisation of socially-owned enterprises has proved to be a task extremely
difficult to achieve. By mid-1995, companies in private ownership employed
just 7 per cent of the workforce in Slovenia. They generated, however,
already 16 per cent of national income. And they are contributing an even
larger share to Slovenian exports. Taken together, Slovenia has chosen a
relatively slow path towards privatisation, meant to enable the economy to a
proper path of adjustment to the new, changed market conditions of busi-
ness. Meanwhile, many observers suspect that this strategy may well have
retarded the development of the Slovenian economy in recent years, not to
speak of the years to come.
Without going into much detail, some facts and figures may serve to
illustrate the magnitude of the privatisation problem. At the beginning of
1993, there were 2.157 enterprises (including 812 subsidiaries) with
socially-owned capital in Slovenia which should be privatised with an
estimated total market value of SIT 817.141 billion (DM 13.361 billion, at
the exchange rate of 1 January 1993). This represented 96.1 per cent of all
nominated capital controlled by socially-owned enterprises; the remaining
amount was distributed among share capital, permanent deposits and capital
controlled by individual owners. By March 1995, the Privatisation Agency
had approved 596 programs of privatisation, and further 748 programs werealready in due process at the agency. This means that at that date over a
billion of German marks of the socially-owned capital had been privatised.
Note, however, that the Law on Ownership Transformation of Enterprises
had already been adopted at the beginning of 1991. This suggests that the
process of privatisation in Slovenia is characterised by high degree of
inertia. This seems also to have very much to do with the complex
procedures chosen for privatisation.
In a "typical" case, the transformation of company ownership into private
hands is performed as follows:
- by the transfer of shares to funds (10 per cent of the social capital to the
Slovenian Pension and Disability Fund; 10 per cent of the social capital to
the Compensation Fund; 20 per cent to the Mutual Fund for the purpose
of further distribution to authorised investment companies). This form is
obligatory for companies except for those which are transformed by the
sale of company shares or the sale of all company assets;
- by the internal free distribution of shares (to employees via ownership
certificates). This form is obligatory only in the case of internal buy-out
schemes;
- by the sale of company shares on preferential terms to insiders
(employees, former employees and retired workers) under a special
internal buy-out scheme (maximum 40 per cent). More than one third of
the company employees must take part in the internal purchase of shares;
- by total or partial sale of company shares to domestic or foreign subjects
on commercial terms through public offering of shares, public tender, or
public auction;T- by the sale of all company assets which were previously transferred to the
Mutual Fund by a special contract;
- by the transfer of the remaining common and preferred stocks to the Fund
(after the execution of transfer, distribution and sale) up to 60 per cent of
socially-owned capital;
- by raising new private equity on commercial terms and transferring the
existing shares to various financial institutions. The transformation of a
company through increased ownership capital shall be always combined
with other transformation forms.
As far as the issue of privatisation is concerned, the Slovenian economy
seems to have still a long road ahead in the transition process. This may
prove quite a critical factor for the future development of the economy.
Economic theory tells us that it is quite essential for the functioning of a
market economy that property rights be allocated. Of course and
understandably so, in all transition economies the expectations and percep-
tions of just procedures and just outcomes in the privatisation of national
wealth rank high in the political agenda. However, one has also to take into
account that it may prove rather time consuming to try to satisfy such
expectations and perceptions, and that stretching the transition period over
time can also cause heavy economic costs of its own. That is to say that the
apparent backlog in the privatisation process in Slovenia may well prove a
considerable burden for the economic development in the years ahead, and
may also cause considerable repercussions in various other respects of the
transformation process towards a market economy.4. Competition Order
The basic function of competition rules in a market economy is to guarantee
the openness of markets and to sanction the abuse of economic power. The
more an economic system is committed to the principle of competition, the
more efficient the allocation of resources can be expected to be. Competition
serves as a combined incentive and control mechanism which ensures an
efficient cost control and maximum productivity, because competition forces
enterprises and individuals to search permanently for new products, efficient
processes, and adequate locations for production. But competition is a
permanently endangered good, because suppliers again and again (quite in
accordance with Adam Smith's famous phrase) try to arrange agreements in
order to restrict competition. It is also an endangered good because in many
instances governments try to impose regulations on particular markets which
affect competitive conditions. Most market economies have established rules
which prohibit restrictive business practices and the abuse of economic
power. This kind of institutionalised protection of competition differs,
however, considerably across countries, according to the criteria laid down
in the rules and according to the actual enforcement of the rules actually
existing.
In the case of Slovenia, the competition rules are laid down in The Law on
Protection of Competition which was adopted in 1993. The competition law
is administered by The Office for the Protection of the Competition which
was established at the end of 1994 and is still part of the Ministry of
Economic Relations and Development (and which, by the way, is also in
charge with anti-dumping procedures against "too cheap" imports). Three
major objectives make up the core of the competition law: (i) prohibition
and persecution of restrictive business practices; (ii) prohibition and perse-10
cution of the abuse of market power, (iii) merger control. In this respect, the
Slovenian competition law follows the conventional standards known from
many industrial countries. Taking into account the very short time span since
the introduction of the competition law, it is of course hard to assess what
Slovenian competition policy does already mean in practice or will mean in
the future. There is reason to believe, however, that the legal principles of
competition policy will not gain much relevance in actual economic policy
for many years to come.
- Firstly, many sectors are exempted from the competition law, for example
the so-called public services including electricity, oil, gas, waterworks,
telecommunications, railways, air traffic and communal services; separate
regulations apply to financial services such as banking, insurance, etc.
- Secondly, at present the private sector of the Slovenian economy is still
very small. Even if the government actually intended this, it would
certainly prove to be a very difficult task to apply the principles of
competition policy in the case of socially-owned enterprises, this all the
more so because privatisation processes could be easily "disturbed" by
competition policy measures.
- The Slovenian economy is a very small economy. This means that on
many a market under conditions of autarky only very few firms or even
only a single one could exist. In such cases, the best device to hold in
check local market power is of course to open up markets for
international competition. But the Slovenian government wants also to
nurture new firms and new industries. It can therefore be expected that in
the design of economic policy competition policy will rank after industrial
policy.11
- The authority in charge with administering competition policy is not a
truly independent cartel office, but a branch of the economics ministry. If
follows from this institutional arrangement that the competition policy
authorities are themselves in a permanent stage of competition with other
authorities in the economics ministry.
Taken together, it can be expected that the fine principles laid down in the
Slovenian competition law should not be taken at face value. At present,
these principles can be hardly applied anyhow. It remains to be seen,
whether and to what extent an indigenous Slovenian competition policy will
develop.
5. Liberty of the Markets
The essential feature of free markets is that they are characterised by
sovereign-decisions of sellers and buyers. It is up to the sellers to fix the
prices of their goods, and it is up to the buyers to determine the relevant
price for their demand they are willing to pay. Ideally, the price mechanism
coordinates supply and demand at an equilibrium price at which the market
is cleared. In this process a system of relative prices emerges which carries
all the information about relative scarcities of goods and services and helps
to allocate the available resources efficiently. The price mechanism is the
key process for a decentral coordination of the economy. It can work,
however, only as far as government does not impose restrictions on the
sovereignty of sellers and buyers.
Since mid-1991 Slovenia has a system of free prices as general rule, but
with significant exceptions. The main areas of still-existing price controls
concern mainly the fields of energy, transport, communication, and
agricultural products. Furthermore, the Law on Prices gives the government12
the right to regulate prices in the case of extraordinary market situations. In
principle, market entry is free, meaning that everybody who has the
necessary qualifications according to the trade concerned can open up a
business. Apart from this, various barriers to market entry result mainly from
the prevailing conditions of the Slovenian economy, concerning in particular
small market size, limited efficiency of financial institutions, and the fact that
the major part of the economy is still dominated by socially-owned
enterprises. A special problem seems to exist in the field of labour market
policies. The employment policy of the government includes measures by
which it subsidizes existing employments, subsidizes new employments and
public works. Hence, government policy tends to shelter existing
occupations at the expense of new occupations.
Since the beginning of 1994, The Law of Force Settlements, Bankruptcy,
and Liquidation is in effect. Thus, a legal framework for market exit has
been established. In effect, however, the new bankruptcy law seems only to
apply to the case of newly established businesses. There is hardly any case
known where this bankruptcy law has been applied to the so called socially-
owned enterprises. That is to say that the actual application of the new
bankruptcy law seems to heavily discriminate between new private
enterprises and old socially-owned enterprises inherited from the old system.
Nevertheless, the debt-rate of newly established enterprises in Slovenia
seems to be very low; available evidence suggests that 80 per cent of them
can be expected to survive the first five years. The overall costs of
bankruptcies between achievement of independence and in mid-1993 are es-
timated at about DM 700.000.000. This suggests that (1) regulations for
market entry and exit are working and (2) that the Slovenian society is
prepared to bear the potential costs of bankruptcy.13
6. Macroeconomic Assignment of Economic Policy Tasks
A fundamental question of macroeconomic policy concerns the role of the
public sector in a market economy, i.e. the tasks and the institutional
structure of economic policies, the goods to be supplied by the public sector,
and the public sector's financial structures have to be defined. If the public
sector produces a significant share of private goods and services, the private
contractual liberty, the guarantee of private property, and free competition
will be severely restricted. It is an essential feature of a truly free market
economy that the public sector is restricted to the supply of public goods,
such as internal and external security, the legal system, the regulation of the
monetary system and, to some extent, the supply of infrastructure and the
guarantee of a subsistence level to all citizens. Defining public tasks
necessarily implies the necessity to find sound financing for the pursuance of
these tasks. A restrictive definition of public tasks would also help to avoid
significant expenditures like sectoral subsidies which then cause welfare
losses in the long run through a distorted allocation system. In addition,
public revenues should be based on a simple system of taxes and fees which
the tax payers do not regard as disincentives to work. Other basic elements
of a sound fiscal policy are the limitation of public loans and strict
restrictions on the possibility of financing fiscal outlays from money and
credit emission.
If no control of expenditures exists and credit finance can be abused to
finance public deficits, monetary stability will be put into question.
Considering the close connection between sound fiscal policy and monetary
stability it is important to prohibit the financing of the state budget by central
bank credits. For this very reason, the independence of the central bank by
statutory commitments, a regime of monetary stability seems indispensable14
in order to achieve macroeconomic stability. The problem at hand is then to
assign to each of the four major economic targets- mandatory price
stability, full employment, external equilibrium and sustainable economic
growth- just one instrument and just one institution which is held
responsible for meeting the target in each case. In the case of a true market
economy, an appropriate assignment would include the following elements:
(i)an independent central bank responsible for monetary stability; (ii) in-
dependent employers and employees associations responsible for full
employment by decentral collective bargaining; (iii) external equilibrium to
be secured by a flexible exchange rate regime; (iv) a government which
guarantees a liberal institutional setting, and produces the necessary public
goods to attract domestic and foreign capital investment which again
stimulate growth.
Macroeconomic assignment in the achievement of macroeconomic goals has
also to deal with the role of social groups whose activities may well be
controversial. Although groups of this kind could contribute to the social
consensus, there is also always a danger that they may act as rent seekers
who try simply to influence economic policy with the intention to push
through regulations which only serve as single group's vested interests but
may cause social welfare losses for the economy as a whole in the long run.
It is quite obvious that a social consensus which aims at the realisation of a
liberal economic policy would be socially advantageous in the longer run.
In the case of Slovenia, there seems to exist quite obviously a
disproportionate delegation of powers to different branches of government.
First of all, the central bank is not really independent, but responsible to the
parliament. This institutional regulation implies that the National Assembly,
which is in charge for the national budget, has also a strong say on the15
decisions of the central bank. In effect, this could mean that the National
Assembly decides how much money is going to be printed. Now, in the case
of many industrial countries, the central bank is subdued to the ministry of
finance. The latter regulation does perhaps imply a much wider influence on
the behaviour of the central bank under actual political pressures than it can
be expected to be the case under Slovenian regulations.
The government of Slovenia and, in particular, the ministry of labour are
held responsible for full employment in Slovenia. In Slovenia itself, there
have been heard few voices since which would put into doubt this
unachievable target. As a matter of fact, since 1988 unemployment in
Slovenia was on average constantly around 2 per cent. In recent years, in the
process of the transition to a market economy, the rate of unemployment has
significantly increased. Quite apparently, the assignment of macroeconomic
policy tasks has not yet been properly assigned. There is no independent
central bank (remember that the central bank is responsible to the National
Assembly). The National Assembly which has the budget authority is
apparently trying to resolve special interests. The outcome of all these
decision processes is not all that bad. At least, the inflation rate in Slovenia
has been brought down to a rate of about 1 per cent increase per month. But
taken on the whole, it seems that Slovenia would be very well advised to
make its central bank totally independent. And as far as the executive branch
of government is concerned, it would seem well advised to introduce
constitutional rales for government debt. Money figures did not really mean
anything in the former socialist regime. Now money has become a crucial
factor for economic development. So the new government authorities in
Slovenia would be well advised to take the money issue very serious.16
Money does not cover all things, of course, but without "real" money
everything is nothing.
Summing up, Slovenia has not yet established a feasible macroeconomic
assignment of economic policy tasks. The Slovenian government is still
striving for inconceivable ends. In economic terms:
- sustainable creation of employment cannot be created by money creation;
- external equilibrium cannot be created by trade restrictions;
- there are limits for the public sector to create private goods;
- the Slovenian government would be well advised to create a truly
independent central bank.
The latter point seems in particular important, because it would impose on
fiscal policy the true costs of this policy. All in all, it appears that the
macroecononiic assignment of economic policy tasks is not very well
developed in Slovenia. There seems to be very much scope for
improvements, in particular with respect to the fact that government
activities have in principle to be financed by tax revenues. There is no free
lunch in government activities. And the institutional network should reflect
just this aspect in order to be sufficient.
7. External Economic Relations
The ultimate test of the question, to what extent Slovenia is really willing to
transform its economy into a market economy, can be seen in the policy
stance with regard to international economic relations. Only the opening up
of the domestic economy to foreign competition and the integration into the
international division of labour can show whether and to what extent the
Slovenian enterprises and the institutional framework in Slovenia are17
competitive. The advantages of openness seem self-evident. The free ex-
change of goods and services and the unrestricted mobility of capital and
labour guarantee an optimal supply; in markets open to international
competition, the domestic producers are forced to keep track with
international technological progress. Moreover, the participation in the
international division of labour would it make easier to overcome the
necessary structural changes and to bust the old monopoly structures. In
addition, introducing the convertibility of the national currency and
unrestricted private currency transactions seem to be an essential
concomitant condition for a successful foreign trade liberalisation. Citizens
and firms could decide on their participation in foreign trade and capital
transfers; domestic sellers and buyers would have available undisturbed
information about relative scarcities through world market prices; and the
government would be forced to adhere to international standards of capital
market policy. In the last event, a convertible currency would mirror the
overall condition of the economy.
As far as the state of external trade relations is concerned, nowadays only
3 per cent of all imports require special government permits such as licences
or are subject to quantitative restrictions. Tariff rates in Slovenia range from
0 to 25 per cent; in the year 1993 the average tariff rate - measured by
collected duties - was around 6 per cent. Capital equipment not produced in
Slovenia can be imported duty free. For imports of raw materials and
intermediate products not produced in Slovenia, tariff rates are very low.
Imports of alcohol, tobacco and used cars are subject to a special 15 per
cent import tax. For imports of certain agricultural products a specific import
levy is charged as a fixed amount. Besides tariff duties, however, there are
general duties on imports in the form of a 1 per cent equalisation tax and a18
1 per cent customs formality tax. Furthermore, the customs procedures seem
still to require a lot of paperwork which is suspected to cause a considerable
degree of confusion in economic relations with foreign countries. The export
of goods is generally duty free, except for the export of some basic strategic
raw materials; for example a special tax is levied on the export of lumber,
iron, steel and non-ferrous metals.
State monopolies for exports or imports do not exist in Slovenia, nor had
they existed before the independence of the state. Since then, the Slovenian
government has taken a number of measures to liberalise its exports and
imports. It has abolished the registration of companies operating in foreign
trade, eliminated a lot of bureaucratic procedures and authorisations in
foreign trade and lowered the level of protection.
A new law on foreign investment in Slovenia is still pending to be adopted.
The existing draft has been prepared by EBRD experts and by some
domestic and foreign experts. Despite this state of affairs, it can be stated
that the existing and practiced rules for foreign direct investments are fairly
liberal and guarantee for instance a free international transfer of profits and
capital. Moreover, foreign investments in any form already enjoy full
"national treatment"; joint ventures and foreign-owned companies have the
legal status of Slovenian legal entities, established and operating in
accordance with Slovenian regulations. They are treated in the same way as
indigenous companies.
As far as the foreign exchange regime is concerned, it was decided at the
end of the 1991 monetary reform to try to practice a managed floating rate of
the Tolar in relation to the German Mark. Since then the foreign exchange
reserves have steadily increased and have surpassed US$ 2.5 billion at the19
end of 1994. The issue of free international convertibility of the Tolar,
however, has not yet been seriously discussed at all. The convertibility of
the Tolar would require to remove all restrictions of international transfers of
capital and finance. Despite its relatively liberal stance on trade flows, the
Slovenian government seems not yet prepared to make the necessary steps
towards introducing free convertibility of the currency.
III. Privatisation as the Key Issue
1. Prolegomena
Looking at the economic performance of most of the formerly socialist
countries leads to the conclusion that these countries did not fare too well;
this, as a matter of fact, also holds for the five new "Lander" of the Federal
Republic of Germany. The statistics of national accounts show that Slovenia
by and large developed in the same way that the other formerly socialist
countries did, after becoming independent, if only at lower rates of economic
decline. In addition, inflation started in 1991 and 1992 at very high rates,
again resembling the developments in the other socialist countries; the
decline in inflation in 1993 is also matched by similar developments in
Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic.
Bearing in mind the economic performance of Germany after introduction of
a market economy in 1949, when Germany exhibited up to two-digit rates of
real growth, this comes as a surprise. One can dwell now on the many
differences which existed at the start of the German market economy in
1949 and those existent in countries such as Slovenia. We will not do that.
Instead, we suggest that of the many fundamental aspects differentiating
centrally-administrated economies from market economies there is one20
aspect which is especially important when trying to attract domestic or
foreign investors: the existence of private property. With private property we
do not mean accidental tolerance of private property or of furniture, but
instead the principal orientation of a country towards private control over
mobile and immobile factors of production. Private control would include
usage of property, the transfer of property (purchase, sale, donation,
inheritance, etc.), or the change in the substance and structure of property; in
addition, straight and clear definitions of private property as opposed to the
state's property are required. In other words, orientation of a society on
private property reduces the monopoly of the state to the production of
public goods and services. Thus, the institution of private property can also
be interpreted to provide protection for the citizens against undue
infringements by the state; thereby, private property resembles, supplements
and may even substitute constitutions which are intended to protect the
citizen against undue actions of the government.
With private control over property the economic efficiency of productive
(and "unproductive") property is higher than without such control. For
example, private property is sold only if the seller profits less from his
property than the buyer expects to do; in case seller and buyer are industrial
firms, the expanding firm will produce more or produce at higher profits
with that particular property than the selling firm - it has to produce more or
at higher profits because the newly bought property causes higher costs in its
balance sheet. In the case of a socialist economy, with the state being the
only owner of the factors of production, government officials sell to
government officials. The cost/ benefit calculation is then on the side of
these government officials or on the side of politicians. Since normally
politicians or government officials do not bear any risks, errors in the21
economic calculus will then be the rule rather than the exception, i.e. the
price charged and paid will tend to be too high (all the more if the soft
budget constraint holds).
2. Different Types of Property
When transforming government property into private property we find a host
of different types of properties. At the extremes there are the pure forms of
state property on the one hand and the sole private property on the other
hand; between these extremes there is a continuum of combinatoric
possibilities. In the following we shall mention the commercialisation, the
lease and the functional privatisation.
a. The Two Pure Forms of Property
hi case all mobile and immobile factors of production belong to the state and
only the state can, through its officials, transfer properties, we can speak of a
socialist economy, hi the case of pure private property the mobile and
immobile factors of production are only under private control without
governmental institutions being able to exert any meaningful influence.
It has often been shown mat socialist property is economically inefficient
(cf. the example above), but what about pure private property? In case the
state is not allowed to own factors of production, the government would
have to rent offices, schools (in case education is considered a public good)
and so on. This would indeed prevent the government from incorrect
accounting; there would be a tendency that the government would only rent
as many offices as really needed. But how about the classic public goods?
The Defence Department, for example, cannot do without government prop-
erty because private property regarding tanks, missiles and other weapons22
would contradict the principle of the (non-disputed) governmental monopoly
of exerting power; private properties would in this case induce the much
cited "negative" externalities, for example in such a way that private forces
may endanger the existence of the state. From this it follows that - quite
independent from pure economic calculi- pure private property is no
meaningful alternative to pure state property.^
b. Commercialisation
The transformation from governmental into private control over properties
often is done by commercialisation: In the case of commercialisation state-
owned enterprises are transferred into private forms of organisations, such
as stock companies or limited liability companies (Inc.). In these cases,
however, government remains the only shareholder and privatisation does
not ensue. For example, privatisation of the Post Office in Germany or of the
Deutsche Bundesbahn has been done in such a way as to create "Ak-
tiengesellschaften" and making the German government the only
shareholder. As long as the owner remains the same as before, namely the
German government, one should not speak of privatisation. Losses as well
as profits are still, as before, losses and profits in the government's budget.
In addition, such a governmental stock company would not be able to work
efficiently because it would represent a mixture of private aims, such as high
profits, and public aims, such as preventing (an increase in) overall unem-
ployment. Such a situation is theoretically and empirically not feasible
(Tinbergen, 1956).
As a matter of fact, even a value-added tax or other kinds of taxes (inheritance tax,
donation tax, property tax, etc.) can be regarded as deviations from the pure private-
property principle.23
c. The Lease
Similar to commercialisation the state remains the owner in the case of a
lease, but as opposed to commercialisation it leases the property rights for a
certain time. Two types of lease seem to be interesting here: the lease
including the right of succession and the lease excluding this right.
The time horizon of leases determines the economic difference between
private and state property. An eternal lease including the right to pass the
lease on to the heirs is highly identical with private property. A, say, six-
years lease excluding the possibility of transferring it to other people - as it
seems to be the rule in the Chech Republic - is highly identical with the pure
form of government property. In the latter case (with short-run leases) the
investor wants a faster return on the capital invested than in the case of the
eternal lease. Many an investment which is rather long-run will under such
circumstances not take place. The time horizon of a lease is not the only
variable influencing the quality of the lease: A low degree of credibility of
the leaser (the government) has by and large the same effect that a short time
horizon has. In order to make leases by government more credible, the rights
of private lease takers have to be safely guaranteed, for example by
including the rights of tease takers in the constitution.
d. Functional Privatisation
Functional Privatisation refers to a system where the state has control over
the factors of production only in those instances where the state is concerned
with the supply of the classic public goods; in all other instances the
government would be forbidden to own factors of production. There is again
a vast continuum of a functional distribution of property rights here; all
western countries fall - in different ways - under this heading.24
3. Specific Problems of Privatisation
a. The Initial Distribution of Wealth
Before embarking on a strategy of privatisation it should be made
transparent who has been the owner until now. This is one of the lessons to
be drawn from privatisation in, for example, the Russian Federation. In the
Russian Federation we had and have to do with at least eight levels of state
owners.^ From this experience it follows that before privatising state
property we have to have an - enforceable - land register which identifies
clearly the institution that is responsible to sell and to receive the money.
b. Restitution
As opposed to privatisation restitution refers to a renewal of a prior status of
private property, based on pre-socialist property structures. In the case of
Slovenia this would involve legal problems which reach back a couple of
decades and is thus at the same time concerned with the problem of
mastering the past (with the re-unification of Germany over the past few
years this mastering of the past has been especially delicate). The
combination of legal problems with problems of justice makes restitution
basically a barrier to the transformation of systems. In countries such as
Slovenia it should be considered to assume that an inheritance tax would
have deprived all private owners of their property anyway over the past
In the Russian Federation there existed some competition between institutions which
regarded themselves as proprietors of factors of production: (1) the Russian
Federation; (2) the autonomous republic (for example Tartastan); (3) the non-
autonomous region (Oblast, for example Vladimir); (4) the county (for example
Kasnodar); (5) the district (for example Alexandrow); (6) the city or village; (7) the
firm's management; (8) the firm's employees.25
decades. Thereby, the new distribution of private property would not be
burdened with problems of the past.
c. Other Barriers to Efficient Privatisation
Many barriers to an efficient privatisation stem from the fact that
privatisation is often regarded as a panacea for mastering many other
problems. Among them are the goal of social justice, of acceptability of the
new owner (by the firm), or of fiscal profitability of privatisation. Especially
after decades of socialist policies it can be surmised that many participants
are still heavily subject to ideals of justice, equality and equability, and that
most probably the real prices of the existing factors of production are
overestimated.
In addition, barriers to privatisation may also be seen in the facts (1) that
many firms are too large to be profitable, that there is (2) a lack of a well-
working system of private banks, and that there is (3) a lack of institutional
capital suppliers.
The Need for Regulation
One of the most important services of the state is to define and to document
property rights. This is especially difficult in East European countries
because the state was by tradition the only supplier of venture capital. A
clash of interests in the supply of justice and in a rapid sale of state
properties seems to be almost inevitable. A solution may be seen in giving
priority to the production of present formal legal justice; the conditions for
selling government property, such as prices, interest rates and conditions are
less important. From this it would follow that the state is reduced to
supplying sovereign rights, among which are documentation of the26
transformation of properties and the enforcement of legal titles. The sale of
government property could be left to private firms (brokers) or auctions,
thereby solving two major problems at the same time:
- Reasonably high prices: just like in other capitalist countries, the broker's
own interest in high sales is accentuated by providing him with a
percentage share in sales.
- Quick sale: since there is a stiff competition among brokers and since
non-performance in selling activities leads to losses in interest incomes, it
is a safe assumption that all properties will be sold quickly.
Problems of Size
After decades of sectoral monopolies in all fields of production one would
expect that the existing firms are too large; at the same time the vertical
integration of production processes has in many instances led to regional
monopolies as well. Whether an approach of a simple trust busting would be
advisable is open to question. In the case that the regional and sectoral
monopolies also provided genuine state services- such as the supply of
police enforcement or basic schools - trust busting would have to go hand in
hand with establishing an administration which would take over these
original state affairs.
The Problem of Deficient Demand
It has often been argued that, in formerly socialist countries, there is a lack
of income and of wealth which leads to deficient demand for former state
property. However, this is a political problem rather than an economic one:
It is impossible that a formerly socialist country really wants to privatise and
does everything correctly and nonetheless there is no significant national or27
international demand for government properties. One can translate such a
situation into a too high price of the properties to be privatised - relative to
other possibilities for investments in other western countries or in the classic
developing countries. This can, for all investment opportunities, only be the
case in a country where the currency is overvalued. A simple devaluation or,
even better, introduction of a flexible exchange rate, would automatically
increase effective demand.
In case there are nonetheless state properties which cannot be sold, this
would indicate political barriers - which are thus politically solvable - or
they are of a structural kind. The latter refers to the fact that there are always
firms which perform worse than others. In such cases the market mechanism
would solve the problem, if only in a very rude manner. In case a deficient
demand is due to a lack of information or due to false information of
potential external buyers, one might consider an improvement of the infor-
mation system.
4. Variants of Privatisation
If privatisation is recognised to be a social-welfare-increasing strategy, it
should be reminded that it is not very important who will buy the former
state property and what the distributional results will be. It was Ronald
Coase who in the 1960s demonstrated conclusively that a welfare-
maximising distribution of income and wealth is independent from the initial
distribution of incomes and wealth (under the condition that there are no
further barriers to selling and buying activities).
Many of the formerly socialist countries make a distinction between single
privatisation and mass privatisation. The first refers to privatisation of single
real estates, houses, or firms; with mass privatisation the government tries28
not to give up classic socialist ideas when transforming the economy from
socialism to capitalism: former socialist property is distributed as social as
possible.
There are basically three ways to privatise in the case of single
privatisation: auctioning, donating, and offhand selling. The economically
interesting point in auctioning is that profit expectations of the highest bidder
are not necessarily realistic. Since all bidders are uncertain about the future
net profits of the object, one can assume that some bidders are too
pessimistic and others are too optimistic regarding future profits. Since only
the highest bidder will receive the desired object, there is a high probability
that he has paid too much. If that is the case and he will consequently go
bankrupt, the whole process may end with the "final" bidder estimating the
market value of the object correctly. In case the government makes
donations, its discretionary influence on the initial distribution of wealth is
relatively high. The economic effect, as opposed to the auctioning or the
offhand selling, will consist mainly in a loss of government incomes; the pro-
ductivity effects of privatisation will most probably occur after the first
round of privatisation only. Offhand selling leads to government receipts
which should be lower than in the auctioning case and higher than in the
donation case. The long-run effects on allocation should not differ among
the three procedures.
With mass privatisation a number of firms is privatised in a unique
procedure at the same time. The idea is that formerly social property is given
back to society. From this would follow that the state has no financial claims
with respect to privatisation. The receipts from privatisation therefore accrue
to the individual firms and increase their liquidity. Again, it can be surmised
that many of the profitable firms will not be subject to mass privatisation but29
instead will be privatised singularly. This is all the more so because mass
privatisation involves creating new institutions which are responsible for
managing the mass privatisation. Very often these new institutions also take
over the management of the firms subject to mass privatisation. In most
instances these institutions hand out vouchers or sell vouchers which
represent a share not in any specific firm but in the managing institution
itself.
IV. Conclusions
Slovenia is different from the other formerly socialist countries in several
aspects: It
- is small, with a relatively homogenous population;
- was never (part of) an entirely socialist regime of central planning;
instead, the former Yugoslavia had deviated in several ways from socialist
ideals (relatively high degree of firm independence and of economic
relations with western countries; in fact, Yugoslavia was not part of the
COMECON and was not subjected to the Soviet Union as the hegemonic
power);
- has been a relatively rich region in terms of per-capita incomes;
- has been more industrialised than the other socialist countries, with a
relatively small share of agriculture and a relatively large tertiary sector
(excluding government).
These differences should have made it comparatively easy to transform
Slovenia into a modern western-type market economy (whatever that
means). However, our analyses show that Slovenia had, for three years now,30
by and large the same problems that other countries in transition have. It still
has, among others,
- tight regulations regarding foreign exchange transactions,
- a highly socialist property system (with too complicated procedures of
privatisation).
To be sure, there do exist almost perfect regulations regarding competition
policy, or the constitutional and civil laws. In this respect Slovenia is similar
to Bulgaria: The competition law of Bulgaria is absolutely perfect, much
better in trying to achieve capitalist competition than the German "Gesetz
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen" or the respective articles in the EEC
treaty, or even the US acts concerned with ensuring competition. However,
Bulgaria, it seems, has had neither the intention nor the institutional power to
practise this law and to enforce it; in fact, the other ordnungspolitische rules
are in direct conflict with free competition. Similar reasoning applies
basically to the case of Slovenia: Competition needs an open economy
where domestic citizens and foreign investors are treated on equal terms.
Slovenia has regulated foreign exchange markets and she treats domestic
investors worse than foreign ones; in addition, most of the factors of
production are still employed in "socially-owned" firms which have to cope
with both the problems of profit maximisation and of keeping unemployment
at low rates, which is - as we all know - logically impossible. The fact that
market entry into Slovenia is regulated in highly important sectors (banking,
insurance) works in the direction of preventing competition rather than
stimulating it. Other examples in the case of the competition issue can be
found.31
Basically, transformation needs a certain amount of coherence among the
criteria enumerated above. We have demonstrated this in the case of
competition. Another example may be found in the solution of the
macroeconomic assignment problem. For example, responsibility for the
price-level stability rests with the central bank in Slovenia, which is under
supervision of the National Assembly - as a matter of fact: the same institu-
tional setting holds for the Russian Federation. Independence of the central
bank would rather require obligation with respect to the aim of price stability
than obligation with respect to a (spending) authority. In addition, there is
some obvious incoherence between the exchange-rate regime (being pegged
on the Deutschmark) and the price-level-stability regime (being pegged on
the parliament).
One may conclude that transformation of a socialist economy should first
and foremost aim at being coherent. Secondly, first things should come first;
in formerly socialist economies the first thing would be to privatise. Thereby
it may be possible to achieve two-digit rates of real growth, just like
Germany did after 1949.32
Appendix:
Synopsis of the "Ordnungspolitik" in Slovenia*
Criterion i: Division of Power, Rule of Law, and Individual
Contractual Liberty
1.1. Does a clear separation of legislative executive, and
jurisdictional power with mutual control exist?
Legislation framework
The Basic Constitutional Charter, which enshrined the democratic nature of
the new Slovenian state, recognizes the rights and fundamental liberties of
citizens and lays down the principle of the separation of the legislative,
executive and judiciary branches of Government. The main legislative body
is the State Assembly, with 90 members directly elected for a four-year
term. The State Assembly has the final power to appoint the prime minister.
The 40-member Council of State, elected for five years, has power only to
delay legislation. The head of state, who serves a five-year term, is elected
by universal suffrage. The rights and duties of the president are for the most
part formal and ceremonial. There is a coalition of three main political
parties, ranging from the right (Slovenian Christian Democrats) to the
leading centre party (Liberal Democrats of Slovenia) and the left (United
List of Social Democrats). The nine political parties represented in the State
* Prepared by Renata Slabe and Valentina Prevolnik.33
Assembly, public opinion polls and the activities of numerous non-political
groups influence this multiparty Government (Slovenia, Your Business
Opportunity, Centre for International Cooperation and Development,
Ljubljana, October 1994).
By discharging judicial function judges became independent. They are
obligated to the law and the Constitution. The law defines the arrangement
and the competence of courts. It is not allowed to establish extraordinary
courts and the same applies for military courts in the peace-time. The
Supreme Court is the highest court in the state. The public prosecutor puts in
and represents the charges and has other competences determined by the
law. The advocate ship as part of the justice is an independent and
autonomous service regulated by the law. However, the notary-ship is a
public service (Official Gazette of the RS, 1991, no. 33, The Constitution of
the RS, pp. 1373-1386).
The Audit Commission is assumed to become the highest control organ of
the state accounts, the state budget and the entire public consumption.
Unfortunately it has not started to operate yet, but the preparations are
getting more intensive every day. It will be independent and bound by the
Constitution and the law.
Slovenia has the Central Bank. It is independent and responsible directly to
the State Assembly. The later also appoints the governor of the Central
Bank. With the regulation of the money in circulation, the Central Bank
causes the inflation ( an additional emission of money) or the rise of the
interest rates and consequently disinvestments. In this sense the disputes
between the authority which provides budget and the Central Bank arise . In34
reality there are pressures on the Central Bank to increase the emission of
money. Usually, the Central Bank does not decide for such a step and so the
disputes are necessary. This indicates greater independence of the Central
Bank.
1.2. Is everybody entitled to take legal steps even against public
authorities?
Legislation Framework
In the past procedures against the public authorities were not possible. With
The Law on Denationalisation (1991) the state enabled the return of the
wealth to the claimants. The law regulates the denationalisation of the
wealth that has been nationalised by the rules of the agrarian reform, the
denationalisation, the alienation and others. If the return of the wealth is not
possible, the denationalisation involves the payment of the compensation in
the form of spare wealth, securities or cash. The law determines the
conditions and the way of denationalisation (Official Gazette of the RS, no.
27,1991 The Law on Denationalisation, pp. 1093-1102).
Realisation of the law on denationalisation
The competent bodies for decision-making concerning the requirements for
the denationalisation at the first instance (competent municipal
administrative bodies, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Finance) issued
More about denationalisation will be described in chapter 2.3.35
decrees on denationalisation in the period from 20th of June to 15th of
October 1992 1531 (1006 requests have been solved, 435 requests have
been dismissed and 43 rejected). With the positive decrees 10536 ha of
forests, 1783 ha of agrarian lands, 13 farms, 70 apartments with the area of
4026 m2, 36 dwelling-houses, 124 business buildings and offices and
290739 m2 of building land have been denationalised.
In the next period, from 15th of October to 31st of December 1992, the
process of denationalisation intensified further with issuing concrete decrees.
In this period also the Law on the Transformation of Company Ownership
was passed, which determined that the duties regarding the denationalisation
should be carried out in relatively short terms of time. In the beginning of
1993 the Law on Slovenian Compensation Fund and the Law on the Fund of
Agrarian Land and Forests of the RS were passed.
Simultaneously permanent tasks are going on, which especially refer to
the help of the municipal administrative bodies at the realisation of their
tasks. Ministries issue written and oral answers to certain questions.
However, questions are adjusted within Departmental Group of the
Government for inspection of the implementation of the Law on
Denationalisation. Continually the organised education of Ministry of Justice
is going on.
Problems
There are problems concerning human resources, organisation (technical),
finance and law at the implementation of the law. The process of
denationalisation of enterprises and capital is very slow, because the36
certifying procedures are very exact, long and time-consuming. The first
problems concern the gaining of valuation documents concerning
nationalised enterprises (balances at the nationalisation). It is difficult to
determine the shares of the partners because the books of the stockholders
do not exist. The problem also appears at the assignment of the person under
obligation, regarding the status changes of the enterprises. The same
pretentious is the question of judgement of protests of persons under
obligation in case of return of the real estate which refers to the essential
mutilation of its economical and technological function. (The State
Assembly Reporter of RS, no. 6, 1993, The Fourth Report about Realisation
of the Law on Denationalisation, pp. 90-98).
1.3. Are there any legal constraints on individual liberty?
The way of gaining and enjoying the property is determined by the law and
thus its economic, social and ecological functions are ensured. The law also
determines the way and the conditions of inheritance. Foreigners can gain
the property right on the real estate under the conditions determined by the
law. But foreigners can not gain the property rights on the land, except with
the inheritance at the reciprocitial condition. The property right on the real
estate can be taken away or limited against the compensation because of the
social benefit (Official Gazette of the RS, no. 33, 1991, The Constitution of
the RS).
The Law on Enterprises defines the legal and organizational forms of
enterprises, which can appear under all forms of ownership (public, private,
mixed). Irrespective of the type of ownership and the form of the enterprise,
enterprises can engage in all the activities defined under the General37
Classification of Activities. The classification of the activity an enterprise
engages in, which may be any permitted activity, is important from the point
of view of the legal consequences entailed. An enterprise can engage in legal
transactions, conclude contracts and perform other legal activities only
within the scope of a registered activity. Foreigners are not permitted to
establish their own enterprises for the performance of some activities
(military equipment, railway, telecommunications, insurance...) and to
establish enterprises in the territory defined as a prohibited zone under
federal law. Companies are established on the basis of an agreement, except
where the founder of a company is a single legal or physical entity. The
prerequisite for acquiring legal and business capacity is the registration by
the court (Slovenian Business Report, 1992, no. 7, p. 18).
The free traffic of goods and services is ensured. The principle of the
contract liberty (autonomy of the partners) indicates the free arrangement of
the contractual relations. Although this liberty is not absolute, the
proceedings should not be in the contrary with the forced rules, the public
order and good business customs, etc. (Puharic Kresimir, Gospodarsko
pravo, Ljubljana, Official Gazette of the RS, 1993).
Concerning the labour market, there are some common legal requirements
concerning the age, medical condition, education and the ability to perform
certain works. Primarily the market is regulated according to the changes in
the height of the wages. The common collective contract determines minimal
wages in its tariff part (from SIT 39.215 for the simple works to SIT
117.645 for the most pretentious works) (Gospodarski vestnik, no. 6, 1995,
p. 65). The state executes the active policy of employment (cofinancing,38
covering the expenses, loans, partly compensation of wage) to reduce the
unemployment.
In reference of the capital market. The license issued by the competent
body is necessary for the export of capital and the license issued by the
Bank of Slovenia for the export of the securities (which have the payment
function). In principle domestic entities can get indebted in foreign countries
if this action does not represent the obligations to the RS, except when the
obligations are assumed by the law. Enterprises can also take credits in
foreign countries (in their name and account) and give guarantee for other
entities (The Contribution for Preparation the Starting-Point of Negotiations
of RS for The Associative Agreement with the EU, 1994),
For issuing long term securities in the primary market of securities the
permit of Ministry of Finance is required. An economic subject should
enclose to the request, numerous other documents (Act of the Establishment,
opinion of the SDK- Social Accountancy Service, resolution of issuing
securities, statement of the persona in charge who guarantees the credibility
of data and the prospectus, as the key document).
The economy is open to foreign investors and only a few common limits
exist (minimal establishment capital, some protective areas, property of the
real estate). More of this will be described in the chapter on foreign direct
investments.
1.4. Are there legal incentives for contractors to perform the
contract?39
Legislation framework
Obligation relations of legal persons, civil legal persons and physical
persons are settled by the Law on Obligation Relations which took effect
already in the former state in 1978. The Law contains common codes of
obligation relations and special codes (contractual relations) for the traffic of
goods and services. In principle the law treats physical persons like legal
persons, although it contains also special codes valid only for economic
contracts. If the conditions are fulfilled the business customs and the usage
can be used. Slovenian legal regulation referring to his area does not differ
much from the regulation of the obligation relations in other countries (Italy,
Switzerland). Fundamental principles of the Law on Obligation Relations
can be divided into two groups: the principles which refer only to legal
persons and the principles which refer to all participants. The following
principles are in the first group: (a) co-operation in obligation relations, (b)
the obligation to parishioners as consumers and users, (c) prohibition of
creation and exploitation of the monopoly state, (d) treatment when fulfilling
the obligations and enforcement of the rights, (e) usage of the good business
customs. The following principles are in the second group: (a) liberal
arrangement of the obligation relations, (b) parity in the obligation relations,
(c) principle of the consciousness and the fairness, (d) principle of
prohibition of exploitation of the rights, (e) principle of the par duties, (f)
principle of prohibition of causing the damage, (g) principle of duty to fulfil
the obligation, (h) principle of peace of the settlement of the disputes and (i)
principle of dispozitive nature of the law codes.
The instruments of the contractual discipline represent the legal means by
which the partners assure that the contract wiil be fulfilled. These are40
contractual penalty, guarantee, earns, deposit, cession, mortgage and right of
reservation. To ensure the fulfilment of the obligations, the rules of the law
provide some measures and means which would contribute to the execution
of contents of the obligations and to stabilization of the contractual
discipline (those are contractual penalty, guarantee, interests for the delay).
These means are explicitly determined in the contract (i.e. contractual
penalty) or are determined by the law (e.g. right of reservation, mortgage).
The law determines that when the contract is invalid (contrary to the
constitutional principles, forcement rules, social morality, or mere is
inadmissible basis- public interest), every contractual party should repay the
other everything that it gained on the basis of this invalid contract. If this is
impossible the party indebt should give the corresponding money
compensation based on the prices from the time when the legal decree was
issued. The offender is responsible for the damage suffered owing to the
invalid contract It is official duty of the court to look for invalid contracts.
However, all interested persons e.g. the state prosecutor or the contractual
partners can refer to the invalidation.
The sanction to contract is foreseen to secure the individual interest of a
physical or legal person. Thus, it is understandable that the abolishment of
the contract can be required by the contractual party or in some cases also
by the public attorney. The legal consequences are similar to the
consequences because of the invalid contract (The Law on Obligation
Relations, Official Gazette of the SFRY, no. 29/78, no. 39/85 and no.
57/89).
Complaints on the committed damage are settled by the civil law.41
De facto situation
We have no gathered information concerning the breaking of contracts and
de facto enunciated penalties. Despite of that it can be said that in Slovenia
contracts are often broken because of not fulfilling the agreed conditions. In
most cases the parties do not decide for the settlement of the dispute through
the court because the procedure is long and expensive and the penalties
relatively low. E.g. a person who concludes the contract with untrue
quotations of supply terms or some other essential component part of the
contract is imposed a fine or imprisonment up to two years. More often the
precautionary mechanisms are used which are included in the contract with
the aim to settle the damage by mutual consent.
Criterion 2: State of private property
2.1. Is private property permitted?
After the World War II. the greatest part of the wealth became the property
of the state on the basis of numerous nationalizations, and the smaller part
remained in the private and co-operative ownership (craft workshops,
forestry and agriculture). With the acceptance of the Constitution of SFRY
(1974) the greatest part of the state property was transformed into the
socially-owned property-as the property of everybody and at the same time
of nobody. Citizens had the obligation to use, maintain and manage it as the
good proprietors. The time showed that such an ownership structure is
economically ineffective. With the separation of Slovenia from SFRY and its
independence a transformation process from socialist self management42
system to market economy was started, based on private property and the
abolishment of socially-owned property. Private property was always
allowed, however in the past the state often defined the rules of economizing
and it executed control; the share of private property has always been
relatively small.
In this transition period there are the following forms of property in
Slovenia: socially-owned, state, private, mixed and co-operative property.
According to the data from June 1993, the 19,313 private enterprises
accounted for app. 82 % of all businesses. It is normal, that the share in the
Slovenian economy is relatively insignificant, if measured say by the
parameters of commercial property held, the total number of persons
employed or by net or gross income. In the first six months of this year the
companies in private ownership employed 34,491 workers, 7 % of the total
employed in the Slovenian economy; however, as regards income generated
the total was SIT 235,917 million, 16 % of total. An analysis (1993) reveals
that on the whole private sector companies are more profitable. 13,399
private enterprises, some 86 % of the total achieving a trading surplus are in
the private sector; together these enterprises achieved a figure of SIT 7,475
million of gross income. Through these results, the theory and expectation
that ownership transformation will give the economy a positive boost gains
even more credence (Romana Logan The Slovenian Economy Today:
Slovenian Business Report, 1993, no. 9, p. 5).
Since the independence of the state Slovenian citizens have been worried
about the ownership transformation. In the year of 1992 the Assembly of RS
accepted the first Law on The Transformation of The Company43
Ownership based on the political compromise (combination of the payable
and the distributed privatization). Afterwards the law was changed and
completed several times. The mentioned law is in its essence the regulation,
which enables the abolishment of the socially-owned property and its
transformation to the property with the known owners. The privatization and
the private property are namely the fundamental conditions of the market
economy. The ownership transformation includes the following basic areas:
(a) privatization of enterprises; (b) financial rehabilitation (privatization) of
enterprises by the state; (c) establishment of public enterprises in the state
property; (d) privatization of the public services (Strategy of The Economic
Development of Slovenia: Working Conference, Institute of RS for
Macroeconomic Analysis And Development, February 1994, p. 7).
Thus, the private property is allowed. The limits exist only for foreigners
who are not permitted to establish their own enterprises for performance of
the following activities: (a) production of and trade in armaments and
military v equipment; (b) railway and air traffic, transport and
telecommunications, insurance, publishing activities; (c) public
information). There are primarily the natural-monopoly circumstances and
thus the possibilities for the privatization are small.
Unfortunately the privatizations in other developed and underdeveloped
countries are not comparable with the Slovenian ownership reform,
except the professional technical execution. Because of the socially-owned
property in Slovenia, which has not the character of the state-owned
More about foreign investments is decribed in chapter 6.4.44
property we could not use the experiences of the former socialist Eastern
European countries. In developed countries (South Korea, Brazil, Mexico,
Turkey, etc.) different theoretical concepts and practical proposals exist, that
can not be unified.
2.2. Is the formation and the transfer of private property restricted
in any way?
The privatisation process of the socially-owned capital has already been
going on for two years. The Slovenian concept of privatization can be
defined as fast, massive, decentralized, autonomous, inspected and
transparent. The management has the basic role in defining the way of
privatization. There is also a decentralized execution of the ownership
transformation and this impacts on complexity and variety of the Slovenian
privatization concept.
Slovenia has employed a decentralised model of privatisation, allowing
enterprises to select the method of privatisation and carry out the
procedure themselves, but on the other hand, privatisation is strongly
controlled by the state - each programme for privatisation as well as its
execution must be carefully observed by the Privatisation Agency. The State
defines the fundamental conditions and has only the inspectional, corrective
and informational function.
Subsidized internal distribution of shares and buy-out enable management
employees and former employees to assume 60 % of company shares under
special favourable conditions. This is perhaps the most efficient way of
privatization execution, because other supervisors, with the exception of the45
management, actually do not exist. Because of that the request arises to
enable enterprises to transform their ownership in the short run (A Rop,
Economical Views of The Privatization: Possible Models of Privatization
and Reasons for the Chosen Variant of the Ownership Transformation of
Our Enterprises, 1995).
The company shall implement the transformation according to a
transformation programme approved by the management of the company
and submitted for approval to the Agency. The programme shall contain
above all: a description of the method or a combination of the methods of
the transformation, preliminary plan for the financial and organizational
reconstructioning of the company, the anticipated manner of company sale
and the criteria for the selection of bidders. A company must inform the
public of the content of the approved transformation programme by
publishing it in the Official Gazette of the RS within a term of 30 days from
approval. (The Law on the Transformation of Company Ownership, 1992).
The process of the privatization of socially-owned enterprises was hindered
mostly due to auditing previous ownership transfers (carried out in
accordance with the former Yugoslav Law on Enterprises) as well as
unresolved issues concerning denationalisation. The auditing process has
been completed in more than half the enterprises which were presumed to
have induced losses of socially-owned capital or reduced the value thereof in
the past three years. There were about one thousand such enterprises. The
Agency for Payments, Supervision and Information, which performs the
audits of previous ownership transfers has so far audited nearly 700
enterprises.46
The suspicion that certain ownership transfers had been conducted to the
detriment of socially-owned capital was not disproved. This is shown by the
fact that in two thirds of the enterprises audited so far auditors have detected
losses of socially-owned capital of a total value of SIT 37,5 billion, or more
than DM 614 million. The most significant ways of causing loss of
socially-owned capital were improper distribution of profits, unreasonable
write-off claims, raising loans at excessive interest rates, granting loans at
insufficient interest rates, and the improper distribution of assets or similar
acts.
While most of the enterprises have already brought the values of the lost
socially-owned capital from their business books into line with the findings
of auditors, whereby losses totalled over SIT 23 billion or DM 377 million,
others ignoring the evidence to the contrary, still deny having caused losses
to socially-owned capital. Such disputes will be resolved by courts, and, in
addition, the enterprises concerned will lose the opportunity of being
privatised in accordance with the privatization act. The Development Fund
will become their temporary owner and will privatise them under the special
law applicable to the Fund.
The privatization process is hindered not only by audits but also by
7 numerous unresolved questions relating to the area of denationalisation.
The process of returning enterprises into private hands is very complex and
in most cases the returning of the actual property is not possible owing to the
increased value of the enterprises. A compensation for nationalized
' More about denationalisation is described in chapter 2.3.47
enterprises securities from the Compensation Fund are (Slovenian Business
Report, 1995, no. 1, p. 21).
2.3. Is the restitution of former property planned or already
enacted?
The Law on Denationalisation (1991) assigns that all the shares, justified
to the reimbursement, have to be eliminated from the socially-owned capital.
The claimants to denationalisation are physical persons whose assets had
been nonpayably nationalised (private property, which passed into the
common public, state, social or co-operative property), on the basis of the
regulation from the year of 1963. The assets represent real estate, movables
and enterprises or capital investments in personal and capital companies.
The law provides the assets to be returned in three forms: with the return in
ownership and possession, with the return of the ownership right or with the
return of the property share. When the entire return of the assets is
impossible, the assets can be returned only partially and claimants receive
the compensation for the nationalised part of the assets. The assets cannot
be returned if they are under the ownership right of the physical or civilian
legal person. The assets of the legal entities in a mixed ownership can be
returned only as the property share on legal entity to the height of the share
of the social assets. It is impossible to return the real estate in the ownership
and possession if because of that the economical or technological
functioning of the objects would be mutilated (The Law on
Denationalisation, 1991).
The Slovenian Compensation Fund, founded on the basis of a special law,
shall acquire 10 % of the value of an individual company in shares or48
purchase prices Besides, the compensation fund acquires sources for
covering its obligations in the following two ways:
• out of the part of the purchase price of sold socially-owned apartments or
houses and from entire purchase price of the sold nationalised apartments;
• from the Fund of Agrarian Land and Forests of RS.
The Fund was founded by the Republic of Slovenia who established this
financial organization for the settlement of the liabilities to the claimants.
This activity is executed by the Fund by issuing bonds and other securities.
Business profit, created by the Slovenian Compensation Fund, is put in its
reserves. Eventually loss is covered from the reserves (The Law on
Transformation of Company Ownership, 1992).
Slovenian claimants to denationalised property have filed over 1,500. claims
for the return of enterprises or capital, while the number of claims filed
for the return of nationalised property runs into tens of thousands. Since
the process of returning enterprises into private hands is very complex,
competent agencies have so far returned only 30 enterprises and 74 pieces
of real estate to the rightful claimants in their permanent ownership.
Although the Law on Denationalisation favours the returning of the actual
property, in most cases concerning enterprises this is not possible owing to
the increased value of the enterprise. Therefore claimants to denationalised
enterprises usually agree on the return of property in the form of property
shares, and when this is impossible, claimants receive compensation for49
nationalised enterprises in the form of securities from the Compensation
Fund (Slovenian Business Report, 1995, no. 1, p. 21).
2.4. Is the privatization of public property planned or already
enacted?
Slovenia started with the privatisation relatively late, which enables the
economy to properly adjust to the new, changed, market conditions of the
business. On the other hand this time lag affected the economic growth
negatively (bias to disinvestment) and thus decreased the value of
enterprises and eased the subsequent privatization.
The mass, decentralised and predominant nonpayable privatisation was
started at the" end of 1993, when all the greatest shocks had already been
passed and enterprises should be already fairly adjusted to the new
economic circumstances and first conditions for new economic growth had
been established. Thus, Slovenian privatization represents only one of the
necessary conditions for definite transition of the economy and creates
additional conditions for functioning of the capital market (A Rop,
Economical Views of the Privatization: Possible Models of Privatization and
Reasons for the Chosen Variant of the Ownership Transformation of Our
Enterprises, 1995, p. 3).
In the connection with the ownership transformation the alternative
organizational forms of the enterprises and companies should be
described. Actually there are two wider groups of companies: personal
companies, in which the partners are responsible for the obligations with50
their personal wealth (unlimited liability company, limited partnership and
silent company) and capital companies, in which the wealth of the partners
is separated from the assets of the company. The company itself as a legal
entity is responsible for its obligations (stock corporation, limited
partnership with a share capital, and limited liability company) (Official
Qazette of the RS 1993, no. 30, The Law on Forms of Enterprise).
Transformation of company ownership is performed:
• by the transfer of shares to funds (10 % of the social capital to the
Slovenian Pension and Disability Fund; 10 % of the social capital to the
Compensation Fund; 20 % to the Mutual Fund for the purpose of further
distribution to authorised investment companies. This form is obligatory
for all companies, except those, which are transformed by the sale of
company shares or the sale of all company assets;
• by the internal free distribution of shares (to employees via ownership
certificates). This form is obligatory only in the case of the internal buy
out scheme;
• by the sale of company shares on preferential terms to insiders
(employees, former employees and retired workers) under a special
internal buy out scheme (max. 40 %). More than one third of the company
employees must take part in the internal purchase of shares;
• by total or partial sale of company shares to domestic or foreign subjects
on commercial terms through public offering of shares, public tender or
public auction;51
• by the sale of all company assets, which were previously transferred to
the Mutual Fund by a special contract;
• by the transfer of the remaining common and preferred stocks to the
Fund (after the execution of transfer, distribution and sale) up to 60 % of
socially-owned capital;
• by raising a new private equity on commercial terms and transferring the
existing shares to various financial institutions. Transformation of
company through increased ownership capital is always combined with
other transformation forms. (The Law on Transformation of Company
Ownership, 1992).
The law is very flexible and allows modifications of the basic scheme and
various combinations of methods.
The role of the funds by the ownership transformation:
The Development Fund of the Republic of Slovenia is a financial
organization which manages and disposes of shares and other securities
which it acquires in the processes of transformation and in compliance with
the law. In each case the fund may demand an audit of the business
cooperation of an enterprise. The liquid assets and revenue from securities
which the Fund acquires in the processes of transformation and privatization
are used in compliance with the special laws for the restructuring of banks
and the economy, for stimulating and crediting exports, for technological
development projects and ecological investments, for the development of52
small business, as well as for investments in the public sector of the
company.
A special council composed of nine members is founded in the Fund whose
task is to appoint representatives of the Fund in the bodies of executive
boards of companies. Five members are appointed by the Assembly of the
Republic of Slovenia, one by the Chamber of Economy of Slovenia, two by
the unions and one by the Fund.
In the internal repurchase of shares the company shall first transfer shares to
the funds (10 % to the Pension Fund, 10 % to the Compensation Fund, 20 %
to the Fund for the purpose of further distribution to authorized investment
companies). The social capital company, which is anticipated in the internal
repurchase programme, shall transfer ordinary shares to the Fund. The
company must immediately purchase 20 % of the remaining shares from the
Fund. The value of the shares in the internal repurchase programme shall be
determined on the basis of the opening balance sheet or according to the
assessed value, whereby 50 % discount shall be allowed for during
repurchase. In the following four years the company must annually
repurchase at least one quarter of the shares from the Fund. The shares shall
be purchased by the company to the benefit of the employees from the part
of the profit which belongs to the employees from wages and other assets of
the employees that they have invested in the company. The Fund shall
reduce the price of the shares which the company repurchases for that year
according to the repurchase programme by the value of profit belonging to
the Fund over and above 2 % of the value of the dividends.53
The remaining, undistributed shares up to 20 % of the value of the socially-
owned capital may be transferred to authorised investment companies.
Capital Fund for Pension and Disability Insurance, established by a
special law, shall acquire 10 % of the value of an individual company in
shares or purchase price (The Law on Transformation of Company
Ownership, 1992).
Functioning of the Slovenian Compensation Fund is described in chapter
2.3.
The main characteristics of the approved projects two years after the
adoption of the Law on Ownership Transformation of Enterprises:
o
• there are 2.157 enterprises with socially-owned capital in Slovenia
which are to be privatised in total value of SIT 817.141 billion
(DM 13.361 billion, at the exchange rate of 1st, January 1993). This
presents 96,1 % of all nominated capital, controlled by socially-owned
enterprises, the remaining amount is divided among the share capital,
permanent deposits and capital controlled by individual owners (Delo,
24.1.1995);
There are 1,345 enterprises in Slovenia which are to be privatised. But since these
enterprises are in control of another 812 subsidiaries, there are actually 2,157
enterprises intended for privatization.54
almost all the enterprises, which are to be privatised under the
privatisation act have submitted their programmes to the Privatisation
Agency. By 20. March 1995 the Privatisation Agency approved 596
programmes for privatisation, and 748 programmes are already in the
process at the Agency, which means that over a billion of German marks
of the socially-owned capital has been privatised. (Rop A., Report on the
Situation of the Companies Ownership Transformation, March 1995);
the prevailing scheme of privatisation was as follows: transfer of ordinary
shares to the funds (app. 40 %), internal distribution and buy out (app. 20
%) and public sale (app. 20 %). Internal owners dominate from the point
of view of the number of companies (these are primarily small and
middle-sized enterprises), but not from the point of view of the capital
value (A Rop, Economical Views of the Privatization: Possible Models of
Privatization and Reasons for the Choosen Variant of the Ownership
Transformation of Our Enterprises, 1995, p. 25);
only a negligible part of applications also foresee the use of fresh equity
capital;
only 124 projects include the public sales of the company shares. By the
middle of March 1995, 23 public sales had been concluded. The average
share of the socially-owned capital, which was destined for the public sale
by the enterprises with the approved programmes, was 40 % (Rop A.,
Report on the Situation of the Companies Ownership Transformation,
March 1995);55
in the year of 1994 more than half of the value of all issued ownership
certificates was used (the number of transactions exceeded 1,8 million) (A
Rop, Economical Views of the Privatization, 1995). The deadline for
investing certificates was extended till the end of 1995;
certificates have been used direct via privatisation in companies and also
via privatisation funds. In the year of 1994, 23 management companies
with 40 privatisation funds were established. The four greatest
management companies ( in the property of the banks and insurance
companies) succeeded to collect 54 % of all ownership certificates. In the
middle of January 1995 the majority of the authorised investment
companies finished the collection of ownership certificates (A Rop,
Economical Views of the Privatization, 1995);
on 7 December 1994 the Ljubljana Stock Exchange witnessed the first
public sale of 20 % share packages transferred by enterprises to the
Development Fund for their further sale to the investment companies
Criterion 3: Guarantee of Competition
3.1. Do general market entry barriers for foreign competitors exist ?
Legislation framework
According to the Law of Competition Protection, a foreign competitor
cannot export goods to Slovenia at a price lower than the normal value. This
action is considered as a dumping import. It is also not possible to export56
goods, into which production has been invested by the importing state
authorities, to Slovenia. In this case the import is said to be subventioned.
Government can introduce antidumping taxes and compensatory duties in
the case of dumping or subventioned import, when it causes significant
damage, threatens or obstructs the development of domestic production of
this kind of goods. These taxes and duties must not be higher than the rate of
the dumping or subvention and last only as long as necessary for the
neutralization of the action (Official Gazette of the RS, 1993, no. 18).
In some economic areas firms in absolute foreign ownership are
forbidden because of the protection of national interests. These are railways
and air traffic, production of armament, telecommunications, insurance
(max. 49 %), editing and means of public informing, revision, (max. 49 %),
exchange intermediary houses and companies for administration (max. 20
%) (Official Gazette of SFRY, 1988, no. 77). Mixed insurance companies
should not offer life insurance, reinsurance and insurance of companies
which produce and trade armament means and armament. Before the
registration of the insurance company in the judicial register it is necessary
o
to gain concession from the Ministry of Finance.
Foreign banks do not have national treatment in the phase of foundation.
For their foundation it is necessary to gain the approval of the Bank of
Slovenia. The same applies to agencies. On the other hand, branches of
foreign banks need concession from Bank the of Slovenia (Paper of Ministry
of Economic Relations And Development, p. 9).
More about foreign investments in Slovenia is decribed in chapter 6.4. Also the new
Law of foregin investments is been prepared.57
De facto protection of domestic economy
The state attempts to accelerate the competition by helping weak and
underdeveloped firms (industries) and by obstructing too many monopoly
formations (second and third question). Therefore it also allocates money
from the budget for the development of small businesses. Direct budgetary
subventions and interventions for development of small businesses
accounted for 0.03 % of GDP in 1991 (Estimation of Economic and Social
Development in Slovenia in Years 1991 and 1992, p. 14).
After the independence subventions and other transfers in the economy
went down from 2,9 % of GDP in 1991 to 1,9 % of GDP in 1994. If we
considering their distribution by purpose, the greatest relative share of GDP
belongs to the agriculture (0,4 %), followed by the railways (0,3 %),
reserves of goods and interventions, reconstructuring of industry and
technological development, respectively with 0,1 % and other transfers in
the economy (expenses which are predominantly covered by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Economic Relations And Development and
Ministry of Labour, Family And Social Affairs) represent the last 1 %. In
the last year it was ascertained that the share of all state interventions was
cut to 17,5 % (Marko Jazbec: Subventions in Slovenian Economy - IB
Journal, 28 (1994) 10-11).
State interventions to the recast manufacturing in the form of fiscal
expenses on public consumption (which were accounted for to
approximately 7 % of GDP), tax helps, state guarantees etc. are quite high.58
With the amount of ECU 2.266 per worker Slovenia was among the top ten
states in Europe last year.
In 1992 the government experts took care of some other forms of help or
state interventions to the firms, which could be called latent subventions.
We talk about nonpaid taxes and social contributions, nonpaid bank loans
and nonpaid electricity, for what the firms got 2,7 % of GDP in the form of
latent subventions (Gospodarski vestnik, 1995, no. 5, pp. 8-9).
The Office for the Protection of the Competition, which was established at
the end of the last year and still works within the Ministry of Economic
Relations Arid Development, can carry out all the investigations about
dumping, prepares the proposals of measures for the Government and takes
account of their execution. So far the office has dealt with the import of
tractors, chips and paper and ended all the procedures by finding out that
these imports were not dumped. When constructional works were supplied
by Italians on the section of the motorway Arja vas-Vransko an incorrect
explanation of dumping procedures was noticed. Inflicted firms tried to
prove that Italian executors got the works on the basis of dumping prices.
This is of course impossible as we can eventually talk about dumping later,
when the material is purchased. It is possible to define dumping only by
goods, but not by services (Slovenec, 15.12,1995, p. 5),
3.2. Is there any institutionalised control of cartels or abuse of
economic power?
" State guarantees represent the greates part of this amount.59
Legislation framework
The law of protection of competition divides monopoly activities into three
main groups: monopoly agreements (cartel agreements are included), abuse
of existing monopolies and monopolistic unions of firms. The law explains
predominant state (economic power, monopoly) of the firm as the state,
when the firm respecting specified good or service has no competitors, has
only a few competitors or has a fairly better state from competitors with
respect to the trade share, possibilities of financing, buying and selling or
because of industry entry barriers. A firm is in the predominant state when
its share of selling or buying goods/services in the Slovenian market exceeds
40 %. Two or more firms have such a state if there is no significant
competition between them and their total share of selling or buying in
Slovenia does not exceed 60 % (The Law on Protection of Competition,
Official Gazette of the RS 1993, no. 18).
In fact, the law here gives a double definition of monopoly which results in
ambiguity in the comprehension of the laws. Is the firm, which fulfils the
terms determined in the first definition and has the selling share smaller than
40 %, monopolist or not? Such debatable cases show us the weaknesses and
allow a double interpretation of the laws.
With regard to the small Slovenian market, it is sometimes difficult to ensure
sufficient demand to enable competition in all industries. Such a state can in60
part be mitigated through greater imports, but the results are not
immediate. Therefore, the Slovenian Government decided to impose less
rigorous legislation of monopolies and to allow the exploration of the mass
production advantages in some industries while in the opposite case there is
a more expensive production. The legislation itself does not punished the
monopoly as such, only its abuse is punishable. Penalties for offenders (legal
and responsible physical persons) are only monetary, quite high and without
an upper limit. The smallest amount possible for the legal persons is 3
million tolars, for individual responsible persons 250,000 tolars and for an
individual entrepreneur 1 million tolars (Slovenec, 15.12.1994, p. 5).
Because of all adaptations needed the law has numerous exceptions.
However, we are of the opinion that it satisfactorily covers all the fields of
monopoly activities.
Cartel agreements covering the terms of business in the market with the aim
of limitation of competition among the agreement participants are prohibited
and have no legal consequences. Primarily this means the market share,
determination of prices or some price elements, limitation of production size,
selling or buying and limitation of research, development and innovative
activities or exploration of their achievements.
The second prohibited form of the monopoly function is the abuse of the
predominant state of the firm with actions which cause damage to other
firms or consumers and could not exist if there was competition. These are
selling and buying at the disproportionately high/low prices, the request for
More about liberalization of import is described in chapter 6.1.61
unusual payments and other benefits, the discrimination between buyers and
sellers, the forcing of firms to accept agreements, cause harmful actions or
to become members of unions, important reductions in the possibilities for
buying/selling to other firms (boycott of the firm) and the nonmerit refusal of
membership in an economic or expert union.
The office for protection of competition certifies the existence of cartel
agreements and other prohibited actions or decisions. It starts an inquiry on
its own initiative or on the initiative of the interested firm. If the office
certifies that the agreement is not in accordance with the law, it makes the
decision to abolish or prohibit it. The firm and the responsible person is
punished by a monetary penalty for the economic infringement. The above
mentioned office has an expert council which gives opinions, proposals and
discusses general questions in this field. The office has also some other tasks
i.e. accepting and discussing applications for the agreements, certifying the
predominant state of the firm or its abuse, accepting notices of mergers,
keeping in touch with the newest market data (its structure and functioning),
discussing general questions, regarding legal competition and
nonpermissible speculations, giving law proposals and performing other
expert tasks.
Besides the inspection of the office for protection of competition, the
execution of the law regulations is inspected by the bodies of the market
inspection. These have also the authority to inform the office, to warn on the
limited nature of the accepted acts and actions, to temporarily prohibit some
actions, to inset the denunciation to the competent public prosecutor or
recommend commencement of the administration dispute and other62
measures (executive function) (The Law on Protection of Competition,
Official Gazette of the RS 1993, no. 18).
Findings of the office for protection of competition by its functioning:
• office for the protection of competition certifies cartel negotiations in the
banking market (Finance, 13.1.1995);
• in 1994 the office discussed five cases of abuse of the predominant state
(monopoly), which was often indicated by arbitrarily formed and
disproportionately high prices;
• attempt by a bank union to define the upper passive interest rate can also
be called a cartel agreement, except if it is lower and helps to lower the
active interest rate (Slovenec, 15.12.1994, p. 5);
• The Celje Exhibition probably abused its monopoly state by charging
twice the expenses of specific services to some exhibitors and outfitters;
• the office also certified some state measures or measures of firms with the
public authorities which could be considered as the abuse of the
monopoly power. The decision of the execution council of Nova Gorica
to prohibit the opening of the branches of firms from Ljubljana in its area
was cancelled (Finance, 19.10.1994, no. 78, p. 2);
• two years ago the office dealt primarily with speculations, last year with
the question of illegal competition, this year more cases of abuse of the
predominant state, inadmissible cartel agreements, dumping import and63
other classical actions to limit the competition are predicted (Slovenec,
15.12.1994, p. 5).
3.3. Have state-owned monopolies been privatised, busted?
The legal basis for the regulation of public-service industries is the Law on
economic public services. This law assures more executing forms of
economic public services: administrative workshop (state monopoly
workshop) ^(at a normal size of production), public economic institutes
(monopoly nonprofit activities), giving of concessions to private owners and
depositing public capital into private firms (The Law on Economic Public
Services, Official Gazette of the RS, 1993, no. 32).
Right in the sector of public services (infrastructural activities) few
monopoly forms are also presented: electricity production sector, oil, earth
gas, water-industry, telecommunications (PTT), railway and air traffic and
communal services. However, monopolies do not exist in other activities.
With regard to the above-mentioned activities, they have a broad social
sense and state control is necessary. Some economic regulating measures
have been adopted in the last ten years, but as yet no one has operated
efficiently and rationally, because all the necessary legislation has not yet
been accepted. The use of state or public ownership is the most common
regulatory method of the monopoly firms. However, some of them have
been privatized, e.g. Petrol (Slovenian Oil Company) and part of the PTT
(telecommunications), while the other part (Postoffice) has still remains as a
nonprofit activity in the public ownership. For most other activities
(railways, communal services, electricity production sector) there are little
privatization possibilities because of the price policy, which does not aliow64
prices that would cover operational costs. Such a natural-monopoly
character exempt state property (Strategy of The Economic Development in
Slovenia: Working Conference, Institute of RS for Macroeconomic
Analysis, February 1994). The railways have been rehabilitated and
reorganized into two separate subsystems for railway infrastructure and for
traffic services. At present the Government is the only shareholder of the
Slovenian Railways (Official Gazette of the RS, 1993, no. 71). RTV
Slovenia (Radio and Television of Slovenia - public institute in the state
property) no longer has a monopoly state in this area because it must offer
at least 20 % of programme time by public invitation to other private
organizations and producers if they fulfil programme and technical terms.
Beside that there are two state TV programmes, three private programmes,
while in the radio area the net is fairly more ramified (The Proposal for the
Issue of the Law on RTV of Slovenia, The Reporter of the State Assembly,
28.6.1993, no. 17).
Criterion 4: Liberty of the Markets
4.1. To which extent does free price formation on goods and factor
markets exist ?
Since the middle of 1991 Slovenia has had a system of predominantly free
prices. The Law on prices enables companies and other juridical persons to
create their prices freely according to market circumstances, Only
companies dealing with energy and transport activities have to obtain the
government's consent if they want to change their prices. It is considered
that these activities cannot create their prices independently (i.e. monopoly65
tendencies are suspected and on the other hand the government is given the
possibility to suppress prices in these activities for other purposes).
Three kinds of price determination by the government are foreseen: the
highest (maximum) prices, the means of price determination and the
acquisition of consent. Besides that the government stipulates the
agricultural products for which protective prices will be prescribed. The
purpose of protective agricultural prices is some protection of agricultural
production if the level of domestic purchasing prices is lower than the level
of protective prices. The system includes some basic agricultural products
(wheat, maize, oil plants, sugar-beet, cattle, milk). So far the control of
prices has been carried out in the field of energy, transport and
communication activities (governmental consent) and for the above
mentioned agricultural products.
Until now there has been no need to maximize prices in other areas. The law
stipulates such possibility only in the case of extraordinary market
situation (when the disturbances on the market could not be prevented by
other more indirect measures or in the case of monopoly situations). In such
circumstances the government has to take into account the level of the
determined prices, e.g. the prices determined (maximized) by government
should be higher than the production costs - if not, the government should
reimburse the producers inflicted (Lapomik M.: Approaches to Industrial
and Enterprise Restructuring Comparative Country Study-Slovenia, Institute
for Economic Research, 1995, p. 17)
Macroeconomic stabilization was the main objective after Slovenian
independence. From October 1991 (monetary independence) monthly66
inflation rate went down from 21,5 % to 1,4 % (August 1994), in December
1993 it achieved 1,9 % rate (Zizmond Egon: Price Levels in Slovenia,
March 1994, p. 7).
The Government affects market prices by monetary, wages and fiscal policy.
In comparison with 1990, average nominal wages in 1991 in Slovenia
increased by 82.5 % and cost of living by 115,0 %, so that real wages
dropped. After monetary independence real wages decreased until February
1992, after which they began to rise. Until December 1993 average nominal
wages in Slovenia increased by 386,1 % and cost of living by 296,1 %, so
that real wages increased by 22,7 %. Average nominal wages in Slovenia
increased much faster than labour productivity. The main reasons for
excessive growth of wages were unsolved problems in collective bargaining,
which were the consequence of the old income system under self-
management and inappropriate wage setting in the past. In 1993 relative
purchasing power of Slovenian wages increased because relative wages
increased faster than relative retail prices The years before wages increased
sharply. While wages policy has never been considered effective by itself in
restraining demand, a well designed stabilisation programme should include
some anchor for wage increases. More must be done to form a stable social
pact involving labour unions and, the business sector as well as the
government.
The consensus about the wage policy in economy and the supplement about
tariffs to general collective contract for economy in 1994 should ensure
gradual adjustment of real- wage level to target macroeconomic ratios.67
From October 1991 to December 1993 monetary policy was quite
restrictive. Real money decreased by 5.2 % in this period and had the
greatest influence on lowering the inflation rate. In the second half of 1992
conditions on the foreign exchange market stabilized, while on the other
hand the Central Bank's room for manoeuvring became much narrower.
During this period, the Bank of Slovenia increased its latitude through
stabilization, effected with the sale of the new twin bill, and through the use
of some other instruments. In the third and fourth quarters of 1992 an
additional demand for foreign exchange was again financed by households.
The problem in this period was shown essentially in the field of domestic
cost pressures. The real effective exchange rate, adjusted for inflation with
relative wages, demonstrates appreciation until February 1993, as in 1992
the growth in average wages exceeded the growth in prices. Quite the
opposite is applies for the real effective exchange rate, adjusted for relative
inflation, which shows depreciation after July, 1992.
Fiscal policy supported stabilization only in achieving surplus in the public
sector, while public sector revenues and expenditure rose in real terms.
From 1991 to 1993 both public sector revenues and expenditure increased
more (by 341,8 % and 365,5 % resp.) than retail prices (298,6 %) so that
they rose in real terms (10,8 % and 16,8 % resp.). The main reasons for real
increase in revenues were wage rises, a higher contribution rate for health
care (1992) and lower inflation rates. Real increase in expenditure was
mostly due to the wage rise and social transfers. The shares of public sector
revenues and expenditure in GDP rose and in 1993 reached almost 50 %.68
In order to maintain the achieved competitiveness, the principal objective for
macroeconomic management in 1994 remained controlling inflation.
Inflation is still running at 1 % per month and the danger of sudden rises in
inflation and instability is still present. Macroeconomic stabilisation in
Slovenia is implemented only through restrictive monetary policy and a
floating exchange rate (Zizmond Egon: Price Levels in Slovenia, March
1994).
4.2. Do market entry barriers exist ?
a. On markets for goods and services
Slovenia stimulates entrepreneurship and educational programmes, gives
institutional support and in generally encourages activities leading to market
economy. Consequently a high rate of the market entrance is being
observed. Enterprises, which entered the market soon after independence,
were raised by self-employment, by reconstruction of workshops to
enterprises and by reconstruction of large and medium-sized enterprises.
Primarily the firms enter the area of small-scale economy, where the rate of
the competition is low and high entry barriers do not exist. However, today
we ascertain that most of them fail because they are not able to survive the
increasingly strong competition struggle.
Because of the small domestic market mass production represents a barrier
and in some industries it is not possible. Therefore, market entrance in these
cases is fairly difficult. The financial resources for advertising represent
the second barrier. Advertising became almost necessary for distinguishing
among the numerous new products on the market. The next barrier is69
expensive capital which is so needful for the entering firm. Therefore, more
new firms are in activities where large initial capital is not needed (services,
trade and tourism). State barriers include decisions about taxation, rules
and movements of exchange rates against the foreign currencies. The state
tries to influence the economic growth by subventioning interest rates, state
guarantees, orders and state policy. Increasing competition with its
continuing new requirements for the market entry is the factor which
impedes the new firms (Gospodarski vestnik, 1992, no. 9 and Gospodarski
vestnik, 1993, no. 3).
Companies are established on the basis of an agreement (act), except
where the founder of a company is a single legal or physical entity, in which
case an act of establishment must be drawn up. The inscription of the
agreement of establishment in the court registration is the prerequisite for
acquiring legal and business capacity. There are some essential elements
which must be includes in the agreements for all types of companies (Legal
Affairs Department: Legal Requirements for the Establishment of
Enterprises: Slovenian Business Report, 1992, no. 7, pp. 18-19).
The inscription of the company in the court register is performed on the
basis of an application. The court does not judge the economic reasons for
the founding of a company. It only requires certain documentation as
evidence that certain legally prescribed acts have been performed (in the
stock corporation establishment procedure, for example, they include: the
conclusion of the agreement of establishment, the payment of the principal,
the convening of the founding assembly, the adoption of the statute or rules,
the election of the executive body, etc.)70
b. On factor markets
- Capital market
A few years ago radical changes took place in the legal and political
frameworks of the Slovenian state. A range of laws designed to provide for
the financial and economic re-structuring of the economy were passed. As a
result, the raising of funds for long-term investment funding and business
operation through the issue of securities has now become possible. The
absence of the capital market over the past 50 years has produced certain
effects that must be given attention when engaging in activities in this field.
These are, above all, the common ignorance of and mistrust in the long-term
forms of mobilization of capital. This general climate is now changing
almost daily and great progress has already been made, but it is still too
early to speak of a completely normal situation in the capital market. Given
that a certain form of a market has nevertheless been present and that the
Slovenian economy has been largely export-oriented, our investors and the
management in enterprises prove both to have some knowledge of and to be
susceptible to new financial instruments.
Last year, trading in securities stabilised at the Ljubljana Stock Exchange.
It has now overcome most of the "teething troubles" characteristic of young
and fast-growing stock exchanges in 1992 and 1993. Daily trading in shares
and bonds stayed put at about DM 5 million. The ratio of shares to bond
sold on the stock market continued to increase last year. Government bonds
are the mainstay of the bond market, while the number of shares is
increasing. Shares from the privatization process have yet to be listed, which
means that most of the shares are from additional capital raised by banks71
and companies. Last year's "novelty" at the Ljubljana Stock Exchange was
the Bank of Slovenia's strong influence on trading in securities. In past
years, their financial policies had little effect on stock market rates, in stark
contrast to 1994 when stock market analysts anxiously waited for
information on financial policies, primarily concerning Bank of Slovenia
treasury bills. It does not therefore come as a surprise that the main trends in
stock market rates were the result of central bank policy. The privatization
processes in Slovenia have been to slow to affect the Ljubljana Stock
Exchange. But we can expect the coming year to be different, considering
that the first company shares ensuing from privatization will be listed in the
second half of the year. Trading will begin with shares of the funds
collecting ownership certificates.
An issuer of securities who wishes to gain a listing on the Ljubljana Stock
Exchange must fulfil the following requirements:
• for A class, four year of business (two years for B class);
• audited account statements;
• capital of at least SIT 1.2 billion (SIT 600 million for B class);
• for A class, banks must gain approval from the Bank of Slovenia for all
operations at home and abroad;
• the minimum total value of A class shares is SIT 400 million (SIT 200
million for B class);
• the public allocation of shares for A class must be at least 25 % or 100
million tolars (10 % or SIT 20 million for B class);
• the minimum number of shareholders is 300 (150 for B class);72
• similar requirements apply for bonds, providing that the total nominal
value of bonds for listing A is SIT 600 million and for listing B, SIT 300
million;
• requirements for government bonds are slightly different than for other
bonds (Slovenian Business Report, No. 1,1995, p. 33).
Membership in the stock market is open to both public-sector and private-
sector enterprises, provided they are from Slovenia. There are still certain
limitations concerning the participation of foreign broker firms in stock
market trade. A foreign broker can only become a member of the domestic
stock market only through the foundation of his own firm in Slovenia.
Similarly, securities issued by foreigners are not admitted to the market,
except those issued by joint venture firms. However, these limitations are to
be removed with the anticipated change in the legislation. As for the
purchase of securities traded on the market, they can be bought by domestic
and foreign investors alike.
Investments by foreign persons are not subject to any special legal
limitations (barring investments in the purchase of immovables). Re-
investment of profits from direct investments are not liable to taxation. The
repatriation of profits, interest and invested capital is guaranteed by law.
Minor limitations still exist in the repatriation of foreign and domestic
securities where a special permit is required from the Bank of Slovenia.
Domestic and foreign investors are both exempt from payment of capital
gains tax. The real development of capital market will start when the
privatization process comes into full swing and the shares of the majority of
big Slovenian enterprises appear on the market.73
Slovenia ranks among those East European countries which have the best
conditions for the development of capital markets (infrastructure, market
mentality, etc.). The only major obstacle to the development of a financial
market is the size of the country, but that obstacle can easily be removed by
adopting the policy of openness to other states (Bank Association of
Slovenia: Banking in Slovenia-Special Supplement: Slovenian Business
Report, 1992, no. 2).
One of the first steps after monetary independence (1991) was the
deregulation of the foreign currency market. Every Slovenian citizen
could buy foreign currency in banks and exchange offices and so haggling
on the black market was no longer necessary. The new monetary authorities
also changed the official rate of the domestic currency. The principle of the
Bank of Slovenia is that the value of the tolar compared to that of the
German mark decreases in a controlled way. The devaluation was above all
an act of adapting to conditions on the market. Monetary policy was quite
restrictive after the act of independence and remains so even now. The
galloping inflation was reduced to a tolerable level relatively quickly. But
the growth of prices is still faster than the decrease of the domestic currency,
which is not favourable for exporters. The result is a symptomatic conflict
between export-oriented companies and the Central Bank (Slovenian
Business Report, no. 1,1995, p. 24).
The Bank of Slovenia can change the height of the obligatory reserves and
thus impact the ability of commercial banks in offering credits. This
instrument is used very rarely, because it is rough and has a great impact.
The changing of the interest rates (which the Bank of Slovenia pays on
deposits or charges on the confirmed credits) has an even greater impact on74
amount of money in the circulation. The decrease of the interest rates of BS
for the acquired credits accelerates the indebtedness of commercial banks,
on the other hand the increase stops it. The decrease of the interest rates of
BS leads to the excess reserves of commercial banks, which therefore can
confirm new credits, of course at lower interest rates. Thus, the usual
consequence of the interest rate's changes of BS is the changing of the
interest rates, which are paid by the economy and residents for the credits
hired at commercial banks. These interest rates are followed by all other
interest rates.
- Labour market
Principally in our labour market no entry barriers exist, except some
common legislation requirements. A person, who wants to conclude a
working relation should fulfil the general conditions (the age at least 15
years, medical condition without particularities) and special conditions
(education, skills, etc.). Employed women have special rights in the time of
pregnancy, after childbirth and for the care of maternity (The Law on
Employment Relations, 1990). A high share of employed women is typical
of Slovenia. The feminization is particularly typical of the social activities.
Unfortunately, in reality the apprehension of woman's kinds of works and
woman's professions exists also in Slovenia.^ Many employers look at the
woman's labour as inconstant, insecure and expensive. Because of that it
can be stated that the deprivileged status of woman's labour exists.
The legislation framework:75
The Law on Employment Relations, accepted in March 1990, regulates
working relations and other rights, obligations and responsibilities of
employees and employers. The law provides the conclusion of collective
contracts on^the republican level, on the level of different fields of
production and on the level of particular companies. On the republican
level, there are two general collective contracts: one for production and
another for services. The Chamber of Economy acts on behalf of the
employer in commercial activities, while in noncommercial activities this
role is assumed by the Government. In collective contracts, jobs are
classified into 7-9 tariff levels, from the simplest to the most difficult. The
main criterion is training and education required for carrying out a particular
job. Salaries are decreed more or less according to the level of education.
Separate criteria for workers and appointed employees, as is the custom in
some western countries, do not exist. However, collective contracts do not
apply to managers and the company leadership. These conclude individual
contracts with their employers (board of directors). The interests of workers
are represented by trade unions, organised by different fields of production
or professions, and linked into associations and confederations. (The Law
on Employment Relations, 1990).
De facto situation
In 1990 the general collective contract for the economy was accepted,
besides there are also twenty branch collective contracts and many
nonobligatorial entrepreneurial collective contracts. Such a system of
collective bargaining has only a transitional character, because negotiations
concerning its adoption to the requirements of the modern market economy
are already in process. Thus, in February 1994 the Association of The76
Employers in Slovenia was established, which represents enterprises and
companies and protects their interests. However, new unions are constantly
organized on the side of employees. The existing system is disputable
because of the signatories from the part of employers (the managers of the
firms, who are not the owners of the capital) and therefore conditions for
changing collective bargaining system were created with, the ownership
transformation and the formation of new institutional partners. Last year the
social partners signed the Tariff Enclosure for The Year 1994 to the General
Collective Contract for Production, which regulates the starting wage. They
also signed The Agreement about The Wage Policy in Production for The
Year 1994, as a separate of Social Agreement. The Social Agreement was
signed in this year (Official Gazette of the RS, 1994, no. 23).
At the beginning of 1995 the employers, the Government and unions
accepted the social agreement (social security of employees, wage policy,
price policy, constancy of the co-operation, etc.) to evade social troubles
and to reach the reciprocal partnership. The agreement was accepted so late
primarily because of the non-co-ordinated role of the unions, risen by their
reorganisation and because of the lack of the Government's initiative. Fast
reorganisation of unions was due to the redundant workers, limitations on
decision-making, wild privatization and pressures on wages (Gospodarski
vestnik, 1994, no. 46, pp. 14-15).
Slovenia develops active employment policy by which it regulates the
labour market operations. In the supply side, these are primarily educational
programmes and programmes for stimulating spatial mobility. However, in
the demand side there are programmes for maintaining existing
employments, subventioning of new employments and public works. Thus,77
the state partly underways the burden of abolishment of the unemployment
from the socialistic period of full employment.
The problem of redundant workers is being resolved by retirements,
shrinkage of new employments, increasing the number of temporary
employments, bankruptcy, self-employment, etc. (Milie Hribar Samo: Code:
Employment, Perspectives, Opportunities, Risk: The Measures of the Active
Employment Policy. 1992, pp. 69-88).
The possibilities of new employment for foreign workers were reduced by
the acceptance of The Law on Employment of The Foreigners. The issuing
of the work permits for the foreigners is based on the fact, that there are
no Slovenian searchers who would fulfil general and special conditions and
would be prepared to accept the offered employment in the foreseen area.
This article enables employers to get the work permits for a foreigner by
reciting varied special conditions, connected with the working post. This is
also possible when there are appropriate Slovenian searchers in the files of
The Institute for Employment, but they are not prepared to accept the work
because of the exceedingly bad working conditions and low wages. In the
last year The Institute for Employment issued 35.365 work permits. Fairly
voluble data confirming the above-mentioned estimates reveal that 60 % of
all work permits were issued to non-skilled and semiskilled workers.
However, only 6 % of all work permits were issued to workers with the
superior and the university education (Finance, 1995, no. 14, p. 2). On the
request of the employers, 28.522 work permits were issued (Gospodarski
vestnik, 1995, no. 8, p. 25).78
4.3. Are there any barriers for market exit? Do bankruptcy
proceedings exist ?
Legislation framework:
The Law on Forced Settlements, Bankruptcy, and Liquidation is in effect
from the beginning of 1994. This law defines the conditions for execution of
forced settlement or bankruptcy proceedings over the debtors, defined by
this law (debtor). The purpose of the law is also termination of the debtor's
insolvency in a manner of forced settlement or financial reorganization, and
paying off the creditors. The bankruptcy proceedings shall be performed
over the debtor who is insolvent or overindebted for a longer period, and in
other cases defined by this law. The bankruptcy proceedings may be
instituted by creditors, the debtor, or a personally liable member of the
company. The insolvent or over-indebted debtor is permitted to propose
forced settlement to the creditor, prior to the beginning of bankruptcy
proceedings or in the course of it. The bankruptcy proceedings are rapid and
shall be conducted by the court, which has the subject matter jurisdiction
and on which territory the debtor has its panel consisting of 3 judges, while
the forced settlement proceeding shall be conducted by a settlement. When
the settlement senate establishes that the conditions for institution of the
forced settlement proceedings are fulfilled, it is permitted to appoint a forced
settlement administrator. In order to protect the interests of the creditors
within the forced settlement proceedings, the settlement senate shall
nominate a Board of Creditors. The debtor may produce a plan for financial79
19 reorganisation with a motion at the beginning of the forced settlement
procedure, but he must submit it within two months from filing the motion.
With a plan for financing the debtor submits the forced settlement by:
classifying the claims in categories considering legal and business title and
other indicators of homogeneity; stating which categories of claims the
creditors' position will not change even after confirmation of the plan for
financial reorganization; stating suggested payments of decreased claims and
terms for payments for each category of the claims except the claim referred
to in the proceeding item; providing equal proportional decrease of claims or
extending the term for payment for all claims of one category, unless the
claimant within one category explicitly agrees in writing on less favourable
conditions for repayment of that claim. The law provides shortened
liquidation proceeding in the case of the worthless registration in juridical
register (Official Gazette of the RS , 1993, No. 67, pp. 3281 -3298).
De facto situation coherent the bankruptcies
Period from 1989 to the middle of1991
Before 1989 there were practically no bankruptcies in Slovenia. However,
after the acceptance of The Law on The Enterprises in December 1988 they
became a problem which was difficult to control and which threatened the
economy. The bankruptcy itself is socially undesirable because it causes
12
The method of financial reorganization includes any business financial method or
combination of those methods that shall ensure the debtor's solvency. The creditor
explains the methods of financial reorganization particularly when he evaluates and
explains the measures necessary for acquiring liquid assets, increasing the capital
stock, economization of the production or operation and the modes with which the
company will produce income.80
damage especially when there is no rearrangement of the economic factors
from less into more productive purposes, but for the cessation of the
subject's business and destruction of the productive factors. Every
bankruptcy causes damage and has its victims. The bankruptcy procedure
has three possible conclusions: compulsory settlement, sale of all means of
the company, sale of the company as a legal entity. In the period from 1989
to the middle of 1991 12 % of all enterprises were sold, out of which 24 %
were sold at the value lower than the estimated are. For about 64 % of the
enterprises it is not clear at what relative price they were sold. In the same
period 1867 bankruptcies and 56 liquidations were carried out (81 % of
socially-owned enterprises). SDK (Social Accountancy Service) was the
most usual sponsor. It is a shocking to find out that in many cases the
bankruptcy was executed despite very small liabilities and a great part of
liquidations was carried out without any good reasons.
The reasons for bankruptcy of enterprises in Slovenia:
• the measures of the macroeconomic policy and the circumstances in the
environment (the recession of the economy);
• the business and the characteristics of a firm and its management (the
shorter business time, the size of the firm, command over the expenses
and incomes);
'-• deviated treatment of the firms and the employees (deceits, economic
criminal).81
In connection with the bankruptcies there are also other appearances:
representation of unreal business information, spending more than they earn,
thedeceits, managing of the business via private enterprises, the improvident
conclusions of contracts, the intentional alienation of the means, the
bankruptcy due to privatization, bankruptcy with the purpose of making
damage to the creditors, etc.. About 60 % of reasons leading to bankruptcy
can be explained by the factors including the elements of privatization
(Gospodarski vestnik, 1993, no. 39, p. 42).
Period from the middle of 1991 to July 1993
From the middle of 1991 to July 1993 the Law on Bankruptcy from former
Yugoslavia was in force in Slovenia. Thus, no bankruptcies were carried put
because of moratorium on such procedures ( due to gaining of
independence, tremendous losses of markets). A new Law on Bankruptcy
has been in force since beginning of 1994.
In comparison with the former law the new one has several essential
differences. The proposal for bankruptcy or liquidation procedure is
submitted by creditors and/or owners (and not by a special agency for the
control of payments and taxes - Social Accountancy Service, the SDK -
which was the case before). Besides that, the most conspicuous difference is
the regulation of compulsory settlements. The compulsory settlement was
foreseen by the old law, too. Its stipulations, however, were not satisfactory
for the rehabilitation of insolvent enterprises. The purpose of compulsory
settlement is the removal of insolvency or over-indebtedness and the
repayment of creditors - but previously an insolvent company was allowed
to continue to run its business, after settlement.82
The enterprise has payment difficulties if the SDK (Social Accountancy
Service) ascertains that its bank account has been blocked for more than five
days. In December 1993 there were more than three thousand such
enterprises with about 125.000 employees which means that almost one out
of five employed persons in Slovenia worked in a company with a blocked
account. At the beginning of 1994 the solvency of enterprises grew even
worse.
One of the conditions that must be fulfilled for the introduction of
compulsory settlement is that the giro account of a company has been
blocked for more than 90 days. At the end of 1993 there were about 350
such companies (enterprises in private ownership are not included). If
private enterprises are added, the conditions for bankruptcy procedure are
fulfilled in almost one thousand companies (247 socially owned and 749
privately owned) with more than 32000 employees (only 1300 employed in
private enterprises) in 1993. In two proceeding years (when such cases were
not announced because of the moratorium) the number of such enterprises
was 916 (1992) and 571 (1991) with 52.000 and 94.900 employees
respectively (Lapornik Milan: Approaches to Industrial And Enterprise
Restructuring Comparative Country Study - Slovenia, Institute for Economic
Research, pp. 31-32).
Barriers for market exit
The death-rate of the newly established enterprises in Slovenia is very low
because 80 % of them survive the first five years (Gospodarski vestnik,83
1993, no. 39,; p. 13). However, since the competition increases slowly, the
share of the collapsed firms would also increase is expected to.
Large firms are the only group of firms, the number of which decreases. In
1990 there were 617 large firms but in 1992 there were only 480 such firms
(2,4 % of all firms). Despite the decrease in the absolute number, their
significance for the economy is still great (in 1992 they employed 61,5 % of
all employees-especially in mining and manufacturing). Because of their size
and illogical composition, some of them fall down and others decentralise.
Unused machines, buildings and labour often form a base for
establishment of new small enterprises within large firms
(intrapreneuring). Mostly these are large firms, which have had support of
the state for a long time and have dominated the market (Gospodarski
vestnik, 1993, p. 30).
Reorganizations of social enterprises till July 1993 (96 of 150 bankruptcies)
caused app. DM 26,5 million of direct expenses connected with liquidations
(44 cases) and app. DM 34 million of direct expenses connected with
bankruptcies. All expenses of the 150 bankruptcies were estimated to
almost DM 700 million. The bankruptcy causes damage in the sense of
decreasing the size of production (cut in GDP), losses of taxes and higher
expenses for financing the unemployment. On the other hand, this is
beneficial for the creditors (distribution of the assets among the creditors)
and also in the sense of the insurance of the morale hazard and the removal
of the inefficient management (Gospodarski vestnik, 1993, no. 39, p. 42).84
Criterion 5: Macroeconomic Assignment of Economic Policy Tasks
5.1. Which institution is responsible for
a. price level stability; is the Central Bank subject to government
decisions?
The Government of Slovenia, The Ministry of Economic Relations and
Development and partly The Ministry of Economic Activities are
responsible for price level stability and price policy. Retail prices increased
by 18,3 % in 1994. Institute of Slovenia for Macroeconomic Analysis and
Development estimated, that inflation without any direct state interference in
price field was 13 % last year and without any indirect state interference
(prices of alcohol and tobacco) 11,8 %. The prices of electricity and water,
communal services, postal and telecommunications services and prices of
fresh meat and sugar grew more than on average. In 1995 a lower inflation
rate is expected because of the less intensive abolishment of price
disproportions. The prices under the direct government control increased
by 2 % in December 1994 - the total contribution of government control to
inflation accounted for 0,5% in December 1994 (mostly the increase in
postal and telecommunications prices). (Economic Mirror, January 1995).
In March 1993, The Institute for Economic Diagnosis and Prognosis in
Maribor carried out the investigation concerning the level of retail prices in
Slovenia in comparison with those in Austria. They found out, that the level
of retail prices in Slovenia was by 22,6 % lower than that in Austria. The
price level of goods was lower owen by 16,8%, while the price level of
services was even by 50,6 % lower than that in Austria. The main reason for
such a low price level was lower wages. From 1990 to 1993 relative prices85
Table 1 - Increase in prices & costs of repurchases in economy in %

















































































in Slovenia increased by 679,5 % while nominal exchange rate of Austrian
shilling increased by 877,5 %. This is why the level of retail prices in86
Slovenia dropped and reached the level of 74,2 % in 1993. With this, the
competitiveness of Slovenian economy market increased (Egon Zizmond:
Price Levels in Slovenia. March 1994, p. 5).
Three main policies were important for the price stabilisation in Slovenia:
monetary policy, fiscal policy and wages policy, besides government control
of some prices (oil and oil products, public utilities, electricity, basic food,
housing, transportation and postal services) and reduction of customs and
import duties, (Egon Zizmond: Price Levels in Slovenia, March 1994, p. 7).
b. Full employment
The Government of Slovenia and Ministry of Labour are responsible for full
employment in Slovenia. Until 1988 Slovenians did not know what
unemployment was as the average rate of unemployment was constantly
around 2 %. Nowadays this is one of the major macroeconomic problems in
Slovenia. Because of the stagflation the Government has not executed the
fiscal policy. They use micro interventions, which means active policy of
employment. Active policy of employment includes interventions in the
labour market with the purpose of selectively regulating its activities. With
social policy the government ensures basic security and standard to people
when they lose their jobs.
Insurance rights in case of unemployment (Regulations on working relations,




• help in preparing for employment
• reimbursement of transport costs
• the rights of workers, whose work becomes unneeded
• the right for medical care and old-age pension and disability insurance.
The measures of the active policy of employment are:
• regulation of the supply of the labour force
• regulation of the demand for labour force
• the equation between the demand and the supply of labour.
Educational programs, that accelerate professional, educational and special
mobility of the labour force belong the measures for the regulation of the
supply of the labour force.
Public works, subventions for opening new working posts, advices for self-
employment and cofinancing of redundant workers are the measures for the
regulation of demand.
Bringing the demand and supply together means collecting data concerning
supply and demand for labour, establishing contacts between employers and
employees, professional advisory and enrolment of the unemployed in
different programme prepared by active policy of unemployment. From the
Government organizations (employers) can get the means for (Regulations
on Employment Relations, Salaries, Employment And Insurance in the Case
of Unemployment, 1994, p. 232):
• co-financing in opening new productive working posts,• reimbursement of one part of costs for the preservation of productive
working posts,
• loans for investments in new production capabilities,
• co-financing of employment of workers in seasonal activities,
• help in training new workers,
• co-financing of completing the qualification or of getting other
qualification,
• co-financing the adaptation of rooms and technical equipment for invalids.
If an organization employs a person with no working years yet or a person,
who has been more than 2 years continuously at The Institute for
Employment, the organization can be reimbursed the contributions paid on
gross wages for old-age pension and invalid insurance, obstetric vacations,
illnesses and different injuries and for employment.
Persons, that cooperate in the programme, prepared by the active policy of
employment, can be assured (Regulations on working relations, salaries,
employment and insurance in the case of unemployment, 1994, p. 233):
• the reimbursement of the costs of insurance for injuries at work,
• money taxes,
• covering of the costs of executing the informative, formative and
educational programme for unemployed,
• a partial reimbursement of the probationers' salaries,
• partial reimbursement of the costs of the salaries for persons, who look
for the job for the first time, for invalids and persons, who have had no
job for a long time,
• loans for purchasing of equipment for self-employers,89
• covering costs of professional adaptations,
• covering costs of professional overqualification because of the new
possibilities of employment,
• covering the costs of informational help in self-employment.
The programme of measures in active policy of employment is confirmed by
the Government of RS for a year. The Ministry of Labour prepares more
accurate directions for executing the measures of the active policy of
employment.
Public works
The Institute for Employment organizes public works, which can be entered
by all unemployed under the same conditions. The programme of public
works is confirmed by an administrative committee and can be entered by all
unemployed. Tne payment for those activities is determined in the contract.
In 1992, 3513 persons took part in 476 programme of public works. The
programme of public works can be divided into 4 fields (Milic, 1994, p. 82):
• social-security programme,
• programme in public administration, education, culture and tourism,
• ecological, agricultural and forestry programme,
• programme for communal infrastructure.
Unemployment90
In spite of the development of the active policy of employment, the
unemployment in Slovenia rose sharply. The inconsistence between demand
and supply in labour market is getting higher and higher.
Table 2 - The unemployment movements from 1990-1993 in Slovenia
Year
















Source: Report for 1993, The Institute for Employment of Slovenia, 1994,
p. 12.
In December 1994, 123.500 persons were unemployed, which is 13,5 % of
the active population. The number of unemployed was falling through 1993,
with the exception of June, September and October when a new generation
finished education. In 1994, 80 % of the new generation was among
unemployed, whereas in 1993 this number was 97 %. There are also other
indicators that show, that employment is getting better. The present rate of
unemployment can only be lowered in the long run, because we talk about
structural unemployment. 45 % of unemployed are without any formal
education and there is no work for them. Among the unemployed with
higher education inadequate sectoral collocation can be observed (Institute
of Republic Slovenia for Macroeconomic Analysis and Development:
Economic Mirror, 1994).91
The results of active policy of employment are:
1. The move of redundant labour among unemployed or in premature or
invalid retirement.
2. Sustaining the number of employed in non-productive sector.
3. The opening of new working posts (only 19.500).
The Slovenian active policy of employment uses almost all instruments,
known in developed market economies. Besides that, it assured constant
financial income for 1,7 % of gross salaries, paid by employees and
employers. In three years, from 1990/12 to 1994/3 they collected DM 1
billion in this way. The bad side of the active policy is, that there is no
control over the allocation of financial resources (Kuzmin: The Main
Characteristics of Labour Market, 1994). New ideas concerning shorter
working times appear with the purpose of reducing the unemployment, but
neither employers nor employees are enthusiastic about it.
c. External equilibrium
The Bank of Slovenia and the Government of Slovenia are both responsible
for maintaining the external stability.
In 1993, the two major characteristics of export were its redirection from
former Yugoslav markets toward world ones and a faster growth of export
of services. Total export (including states of former Yugoslavia) experienced
a sharp decline in previous years, but in 1993 that decline was moderate,92







































































aThe negative presage in saldo means the surplus of the import over
export in the current transactions and increase in the assets
transactions.
in capital
Source: Bank of Slovenia, Bilten, February 1995.93
only 1.7 % in real terms. Despite the recession in Europe the real
merchandise export (without countries of former Balance of Yugoslavia)
increased by 3 %, while export to countries of former Yugoslavia declined
by 33 %, thus leading to decline of total export by 5%. For the first time
after several years, export to Central and East European countries increased.
In comparison with 1992, import trends changed significantly. Merchandise
import increased by 17 % in real terms, without countries of former
Yugoslavia even by 31 %. The largest increase happened in the import of
the consumption goods, which increased its share in total import from
19.5 % in 1992 to 24.9 % in 1993. Trade balance surplus of US $ 791
million in 1992 was thus followed by US $ 137 million deficit in 1993.
The totaLmerchandise export increased in 1994 by 11,9 % if compared with
that in 1993. Also the merchandise import was higher, due to the import of
equipment, raw materials and components. The trade balance is in deficit,
which amounts to - US $ 146.1 million. On the other hand, the current
account is by US $ 478.1 million in surplus. Due to the services which
contribute US $ 610.4 million of surplus.
Foreign direct investments in 1994 accounted for US $ 88.1 million, which
is by 21.3 % less than one year previously. The decrease results from too
slow privatization. The current account surplus in the balance of payments,
the inflow of short-term capital from foreigners and increased long-term
indebtedness of the enterprises cause even higher excess foreign currencies
supply in the domestic monetary market.
5.2. The public sector94
a. Is the public sector responsible for the production of private goods ?
The Law on Public Enterprises is the juridical base for the regulation of
public service sector. The role of the state is bigger in the sectors, that have
larger social importance. Such sectors are: agriculture, traffic,
telecommunications, post, energetics and services.
Agriculture
The importance of the state in agriculture has diminished with economic
development. Slovenia has poor agricultural conditions. In the system of
central planning the industry won the main role and the major part of all
investments was destined for industrialization. Hence, the agriculture slipped
behind and became underdeveloped (Ales Vesel: The Possibilities of
Agricultural Development in Slovenia, 1994).
Lower incomes in agriculture and possibilities to get a job in industry sector
caused the essential fall in peasantry population after the war. The system of
hesitance and agrarian reform caused the land structure not to fit the
industrial and modern way of farming. The farms in Slovenia are small and
split into small units. The average size of estates is getting smaller and
smaller. Our farming has therefore a lot of disadvantages in mass production
in competition with foreigners. The consequence is deprofessionalization of
our agriculture. In 1991 only 7,3 % of farms earned their income solely from
farming. Also the productivity and the structure of labour on the farms is
getting worse. All this applies for the private part of Slovenian agriculture,
which is becoming bigger because of the process of privatization.95
The education of rural population in Slovenia is awfully bad as one third of
peasants did not even finish the primary school and one half finished only
the primary school. Thus we could hardly talk about professional farming in
Slovenia (Ales Vesel: The Possibilities of Agricultural Development in
Slovenia, 1994).
The total extent of rural land in Slovenia is smaller from year to year. The
extent of the cultivating land is getting bigger, but that is only so because of
the meadows and orchards. On the other hand, the size of fields and gardens
is getting smaller. Due to the disagrarization and urbanization.
Technical equipment is improving much faster in the private sector than in
the social one.
The secondary industry has far too big capacities.
Besides economic function the agriculture has also social, ecological and
landscape ones, which have to be financed. The sources for financing are not
determined, however, we know that all costs cannot be transferred into
prices of agricultural products. These functions could be financed through
other sectors, that are somehow connected to farming, like tourism.
The goals for the development of the agriculture in Slovenia are as
follows (Agriculture Development Strategy in RS, 1993, p. 67):
1. A stable production of good quality and cheap food.96
2. Preservation of rural land, developing ecological function, encourage
people not to move in urban centre and towns.
3. Increase of the competitiveness of our farming.
4. Assurance of the parity income to overproductive workers.
Agricultural policy (Agriculture Development Strategy in RS, 1993)
Rural land and its potential product have to be treated from two sides.
Firstly, as a national wealth, which has to be preserved and secondly, as a
constricted productive factor. Both functions demand decision-making
concerning possible interruptions in the environment, that would decrease
the size of rural land, on the national level. Therefore it would be necessary
to ensure the effective security of farming land by law.
To stop the migrations to the towns, it is necessary to motivate people and to
give them a possibility to cooperate in activities other than farming and thus
to ensure them a higher quality of living.
The main problem in the development of agriculture is the small average size
of farms. With the help of the structural policy Slovenians have to
endeavour to get at least 70 % of the rural land in the hands of the farms
bigger than 15 ha.
Productional agricultural policy should be a subject of an agreement
between the state and economy and should not be directed by the state.97
When working on it, technological, economic, ecological and domestic and
foreign market studies should be considered.
The state uses market-pricing policy to mitigate the variability of incomes
for farmers and the variability of prices for buyers. As a part of pricing
policy different ways of price subventions in agriculture appeared.
Subventions affected the prices of farming inputs, redemption and retail
prices. The forms of subventions in Slovenia were bonuses, compensations
and reimbursements.
Traffic
The major goals of transport policy in EU are the stimulation of price
competitiveness among conveyers, the establishment of transeuropean nets
and multimodality. Slovenia has signed the transport contract with EU and
EU is now entitled to free road transit across Slovenia. In the contract those
motorways and railways are marked that are of a special significance for
both partners. From this point of view the present situation in Slovenia is
bad and a lot of investments would be necessary to establish better
conditions. Because of the change in the basic economic system we also
need to make a change in the traffic field is also necessary. Each bidder of
transport services should cover all the costs he generates (Ales Markezic:
The investment in the Economic Infrastructure with the Emphasis on the
Road Infrastructure in Slovenia, 1994).
Railways ( Nevenka Bricelj: The Sanation Programme of Slovenian
Railways, 1994)98
The owner of railway infrastructure, i.e. railway lines with their equipment
and realties, is the Republic of Slovenia. Railway infrastructure is a part of
Slovenian railways and is used by a public enterprise for the execution of
railway traffic. Railway traffic has a social and national importance. RS is a
business partner of Slovenian railways for passengers traffic and for cargo
traffic. In a contract between the two partners all kinds and volume of
services, their quality and terms of payment are defined.
The overemployment is significant for the railway sector in Slovenia. There
were too many sectors in the railway field and all of them were quite closed.
The flow of the information among them was impossible. Each sector took
care only of its business and hence, their work was not coordinated and did
not follow a common goal of the public firm. Organizational structure was
bad, marketing department was not developed.
As the railway is one of the national strategic sectors, it should be helped by
the state in the process of financial rehabilitation. The state should
encourage the cargo transport on the railway and at the same time disburden
the Slovenian roads by issuing licenses for the road transport. The state
should help the railway sector in getting the same position as the railways in
other European countries, which have been helped in getting transit cargo. In
the long term the state should lower the subventions, which means less
revenues from the budget.
Roads (Ales Markezic: The Investment in the Economic Infrastructure with
the Emphasis on the Road Infrastructure in Slovenia, 1994)99
The Slovenian net of roads is an important condition for the consistent social
and economic development of a country. The regional characteristics and the
configuration of the country demand a diffusive settlements, which requires
a big density of roads in Slovenia. In some parts of Slovenia the roads are
the only possible transport infrastructure and have therefore even greater
significance.
Roads in Slovenia can be divided into categorized and non-categorized
roads. According to the last data there are 14.173 km of categorized roads,
besides those there are also non-categorized roads, like town and city roads,
streets and different places and roads designed for special purposes.
Categorized roads are: regional, local and motorways.








































In Slovenia there were 7,1 km of roads per 1000 inhabitants in 1988, which
is really little in comparison to the neighbouring Austria, which had 14,1 km
of roads per 1000 inhabitants. France had 14,1 and Germany 8,0 km per
1000 inhabitants. Roads are technically obsolete as the dynamic of building
new roads lags behind the needs of transport and standards in the world.
Telecommunications
The sector of telecommunications is divided into two subsectors: Postoffice
and Telecom. Market conditions for the postoffice are different than for the
telecom. Market for the postoffice is in the decline, whereas the telecom
market is in the expansion. Both sectors are of national importance as they
deal with the flow of information qualitatively and quantitatively. This is
important for Slovenia as well as for our connections outside the borders
(PTT Organizations of Slovenia, 1982, p. 9). The reasons for the allocation
of the telecommunications in the public sector are:
1. The need of permanent execution of telecommunications activities, which
is absolutely necessary for normal functioning of Slovenian society (the
business result does not matter).
2. The unity of technical-technological system, which has to operate as a
single unit in regional, national and international environment.
3. Telecommunications have to work, no matter if the directors see profits in
its functioning or not.101
Before the division into two firms (Telecom and Post) PTT of Slovenia was
accountable to the Ministry for Transportation and Communications of
Slovenia. There were nine PTT socially-owned enterprises that were all
autonomous organizations and were located in various districts of Slovenia.
Although, Sestavljeno podjetje PTT Podjetje Slovenije or SP PTT was the
head of the socially-owned enterprise, it actuality held very little power.
The total number of employees of PTT in 1991 was 8,300 people, out of
which 2,217 were telecom employees. In 1991, within the telecom sector of
PTT, there were 1,457 technicians and 341 qualified engineers, or a total of
15,3 % of total staff. Currently, Slovenia has 22.1 phones per 100
inhabitants, by 1995, 35 per 100 inhabitants are foreseen. The number of
phones will have to grow at an annual rate of 33 % in Slovenia in order to
catch up with other western European countries and to reach a density of 80
phones per 100 inhabitants by 2000. 6 years ago GNP and telephone density
were greater for Slovenia than for all Eastern European countries with the
exception of East Germany. Now, Slovenia lags behind in this area of
development. That is because for a long time new telecommunications law
was not passed, which would allow for some levels of privatization and
liberalization and restructure the telecom sector of PTT.
The telephone network of Slovenia is organised as a single transit telephone
area with a transit telephone exchange in Ljubljana. Most telephone
exchanges are crossbar type (over 50 %), with indirect calling. These
exchanges are not produced any more. In 1990, we started to introduce
digital telephone exchanges (20 %). Long distance cable networks connect
all traffic levels and are of an 85 % terrestrial construction.102
Slovenia is a member of three most important organizations in this field:
a) Universal Postal Union - UPU;
b) International Telecommunication Union - ITU;
c) Conference Europeenne des Administrations des Postes et des
Telecommunications - CEPT.
The Republic of Slovenia is the majority owner of the Postoffice of
Slovenia, also other partners may enter. The same principle applies for
Telecom of Slovenia. The post is labour-intensive, whereas telecom is a
capital-intensive service (post had 11 % of all capital in former common firm
PTT and Telecom had 89 %). Post employed 63 % of all workers and
Telecom 37 %. Post generated 31 % and Telecom 69 % of incomes in the
years between 1988 and 1992.
Energetics
The production of the energy in Slovenia is quantitatively adequate to the
domestic needs. However, the ecological rehabilitation of energetic objects
is needed. Development policy has three basic possibilities of development




The questions about price policy, efficient ways of using energy and
questions referring to structural changes in industry arise on the demand
side.103
Production of electrics in Slovenia is a big technical and economic sector
and it is therefore controlled by the government. In the autumn of 1989 the
whole economic infrastructure, including production of electrics,
transformed into public enterprises. This sector transformed into 6 public
enterprises and production firms. The execution of the activities, which are
defined as public services, is guaranteed by the Republic of Slovenia or local
governments through concessions and investments of capital.
Public services can be financed from different sources:
• in the complex of financing public consumption,
• from the sources paid by the users for using public goods,
• domestic and foreign loans,
• different funds,
• foreign investments,
other sources determined by the law.
We use public consumption funds for the goods, where the users or the use
of the goods are not determined or for the subventions (when firms would go
bankrupt, but the bankruptcy is not possible because of their national
importance). When a firm has difficulties because of the state's price or
investment policy, it can get a subvention in a form of a compensation. This
has to be settled by the law, which regulates the budget. Other specific ways
of help to public services are tax facilities, credits, state guaranties in taking
a credit etc.104
Ecology is a very serious problem. For the ecological rehabilitation it is
necessary to abolish indirect subventioning of users through a subventioned
price of electricity. This problem can be solved through tax policy. The
system of indirect taxes is executed in two ways. Ecological tax is paid by
all users of electricity according to their consumption. The other way is to
establish a system of prices through the turnover tax, which destimulates the
consumption of non-ecological products.
The next possibility is taxing of users according to the volume of exhaust
gases or other wastes. If the producers are monopolists, the tax increases the
prices.
Services
In the field of market services like trade, tourism, banking, financial and
insurance services, the state does not play a very big role. These services are
developed according to the profit principle, the state only creates general
normative and institutional conditions for their independent acting.
The following public services belong to public and unprofitable services:
electro- industry, oil and earth gas, water industry, telecommunications,
railways and communal services. These sectors are natural monopolies
except for some phases, where they can compete because of the
technological development. Some of these sectors could also be privatised,
like Petrol and Telecom. In the other sectors like electro industry, there is no
reason for privatisation, especially if their price policy does not allow prices,
which would cover the costs. For the railways and the postoffice the
privatisation possibilities are small. These two sectors are natural105
monopolies and have small demand, hence the state property of the two is
justified.
It would be necessary to establish state committees for the price and costs
supervision of the public enterprises. In the non-monopoly phases it would
be necessary to equate the prices with the long-term marginal costs. In the
monopoly phases we should use the so called efficient prices should be
used which would cover all costs.
Competition in the phase of production can only be introduced in electro-
industry and in telecommunications (without postal services).
Tourism is a totally specific sector as it is basically a market service.
However, it also has external effects and thus it is treated in a special way
by the state. The development in tourism will increase the quality of
services; it will improve services from the ecological aspect and as a
consequence the prices will be higher. The role of the state is to promote the
state and its characteristics in foreign tourist markets organisationally and
financially. The state spends quite a big part of its budget on tourism, but
one part of the money returns into the budget. The state plays an important
role also in developing social and spa tourism.
Besides the infrastructure, there are also around 100 firms in state property
in its Fund for Development. Besides these 100, some other firms are also
seeking the state help. According to the Institute for Macroeconomic
Analyses and Development in Slovenia we still have around 54 % of the
socially-owned capital (where socially-owned capital is defined according
to the Law on Privatization). Because of the high capital intensity the share106
of employees in these firms is smaller - 34 % of all employees. The Law on
the Privatization of the Companies under the State Inspection is in the
process of preparation. In this law the concessions will be very important
(Interview at IEAD, March 1995).
b. Is the government bound to a sound fiscal policy by law?
In the past, under the self-management system, Slovenia's public sector
agencies had independent authority in administering expenditure programs
and in taxes and contributions at various community levels. The central
government budget was responsible only for government administration and
subsidies to the economy and accounted for less than one-fifth of the total
public sector expenditure. This system had resulted in a proliferation of
taxes, frequent and arbitrary adjustment of tax rates and a governmental
control over the fiscal policy.
In 1991 the fiscal role of the federal government vanished completely, and a
far- reaching fiscal reform programme and a major realignment of the public
sector were implemented.
The 1991 fiscal reform consolidated all earmarked funds, except for the
pension old-age fund, into the central government budget and introduced a
standard corporate profit tax and an individual income tax to replace a host
or other taxes. Starting in February 1992, a new and much more simplified
sales tax came into effect, replacing a multitude of turnover taxes. The new
tax consist of four rates - 5 %, 15 %, 20 % and 32 %, with the 20 % rate
being the general rate covering most sales. A draft on the custom tariffs was
also implemented and preparation work for introducing a VAT was started.107
A high rate of autonomy was preserved in the health and social insurance
system which prescribe their own special contributions (Zizmond: Economic
policies in Slovenia, pp. 12-15).
The central bank in Slovenia (Bank of Slovenia) is an independent institution
and has no connection with The Government of Slovenia. Its politics arise
from its functions. One of its functions is internal liquidity, the other is
external liquidity or external value of money. Besides the central bank there
is also a national bank which acts as a supervisor of other commercial banks
and financial institutions and controls the quality of their investments
(Ribnikar: Monetary System and Monetary Policy).
Because of the decentralized banking system in former Yugoslavia the
induction of the special financial field in Slovenia was technically free and
simple. All relation among the state, banks and firms were settled over The
National Bank of Slovenia, except, of course, relation with the population or
with the people, who held cash. The main reason for the introduction of the
new system was the abolishment of crediting some firms. The bank of
Slovenia does not approve of credits. At the beginning it did not have any
foreign currency reserves and hence it could use only the system of floating
rate. The set exchange rate and interest rate were both market rates. The
money comes into circulation through net credits to domestic sectors and
through net buyings of foreign currencies in the foreign exchange market
(Ribnikar: Monetary System and Monetary Theory).
The monetary policy of the Republic of Slovenia, which can be described as
restrictive, is executed by The Bank of Slovenia. The constitution of the
Republic of Slovenia as well as The Law on the Bank of Slovenia determine,108
that the Bank of Slovenia is independent in the execution of the monetary
policy tasks. The short-term goals of the monetary policy are: an appropriate
money base, an appropriate general bank liquidity and an appropriate
general liquidity in foreign payments. To achieve those goals, the Bank of
Slovenia uses the following instruments: open market policy, changes in the
ratio of the required reserves and discount policy.
The Bank of Slovenia achieved one of the major goals of the economic
policy, that is a fall in the inflation rate. The other goals of the economic
policy have not been achieved. The bank of Slovenia decides independently
about the central-bank financing of the budget deficit. The bank of Slovenia
also has a very important role in determining the economic policy, mostly in
forming goals and in the execution of monetary policy tasks (Ribnikar:
Monetary system and Monetary Policy).
5.3. Social consensus (major interest groups, their attitude towards
the state and conflicts between government bodies and state
powers)
As late as in 1994 a variety of social partnership was de facto introduced in
Slovenia.
There are three major interest groups: unions as representatives of
employees, government and employers.
The social consensus is a consequence of the common interest of all partners
to accelerate economic growth, to increase employment, to stabilize
economy and to improve the social and legal security in Slovenia.109
The Government of the Republic of Slovenia will suggest the laws and
other regulations, changes in laws and other measures, that will enable the
execution of the social consensus. It will do its best for the realization of all
the measures in the consensus.
Employers will consider and realize the social consensus in all their
associations and organizations in Slovenia.
Employees agents will respect and consider the social consensus in all
institutions, firms and other organizations (Social Consensus for 1995).
Direction of the social consensus
In 1995 the economic and social policy assures (Social Consensus for 1995)
the following:
1. at least 5 % economic growth,
2. utmost 10 % inflation in 1995,
3. unification in determining wages, other personal incomes and interest
rates and the adaptation of these mechanisms to the inflation rates,
4. opening of new working posts, decrease of unemployment, increasing
self-employment, the growth of the employment should amount to 1- %,
5. incentives for saving,
6. decreasing the part of total public-financial incomes and expenses in
GDP,
7. decreasing the fiscal charge of wages, when the public consumption
grows faster than determined in this consensus,no
8. preservation of the real value of wages,
9. equable distribution of the social burden among different generations
and strata,
10. improvement of the social security of the most insecure groups of the
population and getting closer to the European system of the social
security,
11. to ensure the legal security by ensuring more efficient work of the social
courts and inspections,
12. the state will ensure decreasing of interest rates and a gradual
abolishment of the revalorization system,
13. neutrality of the exchange rate policy and the derogation of the
difference between the inflation and the exchange rate, which means,
that the exchange rate will grow at least at the same rate as the inflation.
The social consensus will realize the goals in the following fields (Social
Consensus for 1995):
1. The employment: the solving of the unemployment problem is one of the
primary tasks for all social partners. Therefore all partners want to improve
the employment possibilities and the opening of new working posts, they
want to stop illegal employment and efficiently supervise the rights of the
unemployed.
2. Wages: collective contracts are the basic instrument for determining basic
wages. The difference between the lowest and the highest wages should not
be higher than it is in other developed countries. It is forbidden to pay the
work in any form, that would avoid payment of taxes and contributions. TheIll
real wages in 1995 will be the same as in 1994. The minimum gross wage
should account for at least 40 % of the actual gross wage in Slovenia.
3. Social security: the system of the social security should not be an
obstacle in further development of the society. Social rights must be
consistent with the economic ability of the state.
4. Old-age pensions: the current execution of the pension-invalid system
should not be an additional burden for wages. The old-age pensions will
grow proportionally to the coefficient of the volume of the financial means
and to the number of retired people.
5. Prices: the goal of the economic policy is stable prices. The government
will ensure, that prices in non-tradeable, oligopoly and monopoly sectors
will not grow above the average. The inflation in 1995 should not exceed
10 %. The price proportions will be gradually abolished.
6. Taxes and contributions: the government will assure the following in the
field of taxes and contributions and in the field of the budget:
- stimulation of investing in firms and corporations,
- changes of the laws, which will enable decrease of direct taxes and
contributions and increase of the wealth taxes over the minimum
standards,
- the base of the payment of taxes and contributions should not be lower
than the basic wage for a specific tariff group.112
7. Interest rates: The Government of Slovenia and the Bank of Slovenia
want to lower the revalorization and real interest rates and will gradually,
with monetary, fiscal and income policy, ensure the abolishment of the
revalorization as a whole.
8. Exchange rate policy: in 1995 the difference between inflation and
exchange rate will be abolished.
Legal security
Legal security is one of the basic needs for an efficient economic and social
development. Hence the Government of Slovenia will try to accept only the
measures, which will enable greater efficiency and hemstitchness of the
Slovenian legal system. Employers as well as employees will help to ensure
legal security with better informing (Janez Tusek: Social Consensus, 1995).
The social consensus has not been signed by any party yet. It has been
prepared by employers. The Government has not signed it because of the
lack of the initiative for the negotiations with the partners and the unions
have not signed it because of too uncoordinated actions and mutual mistrust.
Everything has been done without Economic and Social Council, that should
act as a coordinator and should solve problems, that arise in the process of
negotiations. The Government does not see it as a serious body, which
causes even greater mistrust with other partners (Janez Tusek: King Arthur
and the Cavaliers of the Triangle Table).
Economic and Social Council was established although it was not legally
institutionalized. From the Government side the council was recognized113
informally and incidentally as a supplement to the agreement concerning the
wage policy for 1994. At first the Government did not agree on the
establishment of a tripartite body. Consequently, the unions conditioned
their signature of wage agreement for 1994 with an agreement concerning
the establishment of a tripartite body. So far, the Government
representatives attending the meetings of this body have not always been
appropriately empowered. It remains for the near future to definitely legalize
the council and to oblige the government to accord with or at least to take
account of the views of employees and employers with their own
standpoints.(Lapornik: Approaches to Industrial and Enterprise
Restructuring Comparative Study - Slovenia, 1995).
Criterion 6: Trade relations
6.1. To which extent do import restrictions exist?
Imports of goods are generally free concerning that nowadays 97 % of
imports is absolutely free, for 1 % licences are needed because of control
and only 1 % is subject to quantitative restrictions, which refer to individual
agricultural products, textiles and clothing. Although the Government may,
in accordance with international agreements, and in view of. the
implementation of development and protection policies, prescribe quotas for
imports of individual goods and require permits.
What has been done?114
Tariff rates in Slovenia range from 0-25 %; the average tariff rate
collected in the first nine months of 1993 was around 6 %. Capital
equipment not produced in Slovenia can be imported duty free. For imports
of raw materials and intermediate products not produced in Slovenia, tariff
rates have been reduced by 70 %. There is also 1 % equalization tax and a
/ %•• customs formality tax. Special import taxes have been abolished
except 15 % import tax which has to be paid for imports of alcohol, tobacco
and used cars. For imports of certain agricultural products a specific
import levy is charged as a fixed amount.
In 1993 producers on average paid only 2,6 % of customs duties or 4,0 %
of all import duties for imported raw materials and components. Higher
rates have to be paid for equipment with 4,6 % of customs duties and 6,2 %
of all import duties. When importing consumer goods 13,4 % of customs
duties and 15,6 % of all duties were paid on average. The consequences of
the abolishment of the preferential import from Croatia were considerable
exactly at the import of the consumer goods - earlier the duty free import
could not be diverged into other opportunities of the exemptions and
deductions. Because of that the share of the import with the whole payment
of import duties rose highly (from 52,3 % in 1992 to 90,7 % in 1993) (Boris
Majcen, Foreign Trade Protection of RS Economy - The Analysis of the
Situation after the Independence, Slovenian Economic Review, Volume 45,
1994, no. 1-3, pp. 214-222).
To compensate the lost markets, Slovenia is entering into intensive
cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on the basis of
free trade agreements. In trading between Slovenia and the former
Czechoslovakia customs duties will be gradually completely eliminated for115
all manufactured goods till 1996 (in January 1995 customs duties had to be
paid for only 40 % of products). For trading between Slovenia and Hungary
a gradually execution of the same measure will have been carried out by the
end of 2000 (Slovenia, 1994, pp. 31-33).
Problems by de facto execution (deduction):
Unfortunately at present in the customs clearance area, there are too many
prescriptions which cause a considerable confusion in economic relations
with foreign countries. It is necessary to make some changes in the sense of
a more modem and more effective foreign trade legislation (protection)
following models in developed European countries. At the practical
execution of prescriptions, it often comes to several differences between
the dedarated and de facto rates of protection, by height and by structure
(primarily in mining and recast manufacturing). Still a considerable
protection of recast manufacturing and consumption goods exists
(Majcen B.).
6.2. To which extent do export restrictions exist?
As befits a small country, Slovenia is heavily dependent on exports and
international trade remains vital to its economy. Slovenia is no doubt among
the most open European countries, because it is on the 38th position by the
value of the export (in 1994 the export rose to US $ 6,194 million). The
need to expand foreign markets became even more evident with
independence in 1991, since the domestic market became too small to
absorb the production of Slovenian companies. The process of adapting to
the most stringent international standards has been undertaking place in116
Slovenia for some time now and we have no special problems because
Slovenia has been traditionally open with narrow connections to Western
Europe. All types of companies can be involved in foreign trade, there are
no obstacles and the registration process is simple (Slovenia, 1994, p. 24).
Exports of goods is generally duty free, except the export of some basically
strategic raw materials, i.e. a special tax applies for on the export of lumber
and some types of sawn wood of the lower cultivation grade and for the
export of iron, steel and non-ferrous metal waste. Thus, a policy is pursuant
to the requirements of a more accelerating export.
6.3. Are there still state monopolies for exports and imports?
State monopolies for exports or imports do not exist in Slovenia, nor had
they existed before the independence of the state. Since the independence,
the Slovenian Government has taken a number of measures to liberalize its
exports and imports. It has abolished the registration of the companies
operating in the foreign trade, eliminated the bureaucratic procedures and
authorizations in foreign trade and lowered the level of protection. The
Government can take the following measures for some areas: (a) prohibition
of imports or exports, (b) quantitative or quality limits on imports/exports
(strategically important raw materials and'components), (c) special
allowances for import/export (weapons). This occurs mostly in cases of
natural disasters, extraordinary circumstances, disturbances in the market or
similar conditions or for the establishment of an appropriate control (The
Law on Protection of Competition, 1993, pp. 105-106).
6.4. Is the free movement of capital flows guaranteed?117
a. Foreign direct investment
With the independence (1991) Slovenia assumed the Yugoslav Law on the
Foreign Investments from 1988, set on the international norms. The new
Law on the Foreign Investments is being prepared, because the conditions
have changed dramatically, especially with the process of privatization
where the acquisitions will gain importance. The Law has been prepared by
EBRD experts and by some domestic and foreign experts. Despite of that it
can be stated, that the existing legislation is fairly liberal and guarantees a
free transfer of profits and capital abroad.
Basic characteristics of the existing legislation framework
Foreign investments in any form enjoy full "national treatment", i.e.
companies with foreign capital participation (joint ventures) and wholly-
foreign-owned companies have a status of Slovenian legal entities,
established and operating in accordance with Slovenian regulations. They
are treated in the same way as indigenous companies.
The minimum founding capital for establishing a new company (applicable
to all companies, whether there is foreign participation or not) is SIT 1,5
million (app. USD 11,700 at the current exchange rate) for a limited liability
company and SIT 3 million (app. USD 23,400) for a joint stock company.
Foreign investor can co-operate in the privatization programmes of public
firms as a minor or a major partner. The following ways of direct foreign
investments are possible: establishment of a new equity joint venture in the118
form of a mixed firm or a firm in the absolute foreign property, capital
enlargement of an existing domestic firm, acquisition of a part of an existing
domestic firm (also to 100 %), and redemption of a domestic firm's sources.
(Privatization programmes presented till now indicate that firms decide more
on buy-out by employees if that is possible, thus outside owners, among
whom perhaps also foreign investors are, does not remain much for sale to).
Concerning the forms of investments, possibilities are almost limitless:
equity joint venture, firms in absolute foreign possession (100 % foreign
branches, nonproprietary contractual joint ventures, concessions for
exploitation of renewable natural wealth or goods in common use and B.O.T
agreements (built operate transfer agreement) for construction, financing and
exploitation of manufacturing infrastructure and other capacities in a certain
period of time.
Companies established with foreign capital or share acquisitions in existing
companies acquire legal status upon registration at local court. Any share or
asset deal with a local company which has not yet been privatized is
possible, but it has to be approved by the Agency for Restructuring and
Privatization of the Republic of Slovenia. The approval of Agency is also
necessary when foreign investor wants to buy shares from pension,
restitution/reimbursement and special investment funds.
All sectors of the economy are open to foreign investors. Wholly foreign-
owned companies (no maximum foreign share is specified) are not allowed
in military equipment field, rail and air transport, communications and
telecommunications, insurance, publishing and mass media. In auditing
companies maximum 49 % of foreign share is permitted, in stock brooking119
companies 24 %, in the investment companies (for the management of the
investment funds) 20 %, and in author investment companies (for the
management of investment funds collecting privatization certificates) 10 %.
Legal entities established and registered in Slovenia, regardless of the
foreign share, may own real estate. Foreign natural (individuals) and legal
persons are subject to the foreign law and cannot own real estate.
With 30 % profit tax rate Slovenia is among European countries with the
lowest tax burden. Tax deductions: (a) 20 % of the sum invested in tangible
assets (except motor vehicles) and intangible long-term assets, provided the
assets in question are not alienated within a period of three years, in which
case the tax base is increased; (b) up to 10 % of the tax base for investment
reserves for tangible assets and intangible long-term assets, within a period
of 4 years; (c) 30 % of salaries paid out within the first 12 months of
employment to trainees, those who enter their first employment, or to
employees who, before contracting employment, were registrated at the
employment office for at least 6 months, if an employer employs them on a
permanent basis for at least two years.
Foreign shareholders are entitled to free and unrestricted transfer of their
profits abroad in foreign currency.
Problems:
There are still some problems, which have not been resolved by the
legislation. The first is that a branch of a foreign firm is not a legal entity
by the law and so it is not equated to a domestic firm respecting the rights120
for buying of realties to perform economic activities. The same applies for a
foreign agency. The second problem derives from the request that the
president, procurator or the majority of the administration members of
the company should hold the Slovenian citizenship. Thus the owner of the
capital is limited in the free choice and in the appointment of the company
president. Further, the work permits is needed for foreign workers who want
an employment in Slovenia. This permit is the basis for issuing an
employment visa. When foreigners have found employment in a branch or
an agency of the foreign firm they have to gain the business visa. Foreign
banks in the phase of establishment have no national treatment and have
to gain the allowance of the Bank of Slovenia. Concerning foreign service
firms there are some common limits (branches with registered office in
Slovenia or forms registrated in Slovenia, the Government of Slovenia can
prescribe some additional conditions and criterions) (Proposal to
Associating Agreement - Ministry of Economic Relations and
Development).
Who are foreign investors in Slovenia?
By the end of 1993 the number of FDI projects increased to more than
1,000 and the value of invested foreign capital to USD 785 million. This
may not seem much by international standards, but the fact is that USD 395
per capita stock of FDI puts Slovenia immediately after Hungary among
all the countries in transition. In 1993, FDI inflows in Slovenia represented
5,3 % of total fixed investments and 1,03 % of Slovenian GDP in the same
year. The prevailing form is the equity foreign investments and among
them the equity joint investments, while the wholly foreign firms are rare.121
Most of FDI in Slovenia comes from Austria (20,4 % of end 1993 stock).
Germany (19,6 %) and Italy (13,6 %). High rankings of Croatia (21,0 %)
and, to some extent, France (16,3 %) are a consequence of a particular
situation, and do not reflect adequately the actual situation. In the case of
Croatia, this is the consequence of the inherited situation from the former
Yugoslavia (previous representative offices of Croatian companies in
Slovenia have been transformed into companies in the ownership of
Croatia, while in the case of France, high ranking is almost exclusively due
to Renault's investment in car manufacturing. The aforementioned countries
accounted for more than 90 % of FDI stock in Slovenia. (Matija Rojec,
Foreign Investment in Slovenian Development, 1994).
Manufacturing industry with 63,1% share in total stock of FDI by the end
of 1993 is far the most important recipient of FDI in Slovenia, followed by
business services and trade (21,3 %). In the manufacturing industry , FDI is
concentrated in the car manufacturing, paper manufacturing and electrical
machinery and appliances manufacturing (Finance).
A typical foreign investor in Slovenia is a small to medium sized company
from one of the near European Union countries, being also Slovenia's major
foreign trade partners. Nevertheless, FDI stock is heavily concentrated on
about a dozen of the largest FDI projects with European multinational
enterprises. Bayer, Renault, Citroen, Henkel, Iveco, IBM, Siemens,
Semperit, Bosch are just some of well known multinational enterprises
which have invested in Slovenia so far. Among foreign acquisitions, the
largest acquisitions have been so far as follows: Ljubljana Tobacco Factory
by Reemtsma (Germany) and Seita (France), of insulating construction122
materials producer Novoterm by Pfleiderer (Germany) and car producing
factory Revoz by Renault (France).
In October 1994 FIT AS (Foreign Investors and Traders Association in
Slovenia) was founded with the aim of informing foreign investors about
Slovenian legislation and at the same time formulating common interests
which it will present to government representatives and political parties.
Although this economic association has been established only recently, it has
already been joint by more than 100 of most important foreign investors
(Finance).
Motives and reasons for investing in Slovenia:
In general, to get access/enlarge the share in the local market has
traditionally been the most important motive of foreign investors for coming
in Slovenia. Nevertheless, foreign investors do not follow only one motive
but have multi-objective (growth, profitability, expansion of exports, etc.)
approach to their ventures in Slovenia. In spite of the major importance of
local market motive, foreign investors ranked very high also motives like
reduction of production costs, and export base for third countries.
46 % of foreign investors in Slovenia had fully and 38 % had partially
realized their objectives. Only 16 % have not realized their objectives at
all. (Results of interviews). Foreign investors consider the performance of
their entities in Slovenia, on average, as less successful than that of parent
companies but they are considered to be more or less as successful as their
subsidiaries/joint ventures in most non-EU countries. (Matija Rojec, Foreign
Investment in Slovenian Development, 1994).123
The main reasons quoted by foreign investors for coming to Slovenia are:
(a) successful previous cooperation with Slovenian joint venture
partner/target company; (b) high purchasing power and growth potential of
the small local market; (c) established trade links with other parts of the
former Yugoslavia and with Central and Eastern European countries; (d)
high export orientation and established market shares of Slovenian
companies in West European markets; (e) relatively high management and
technical/technological expertise due to the long exposure to quasi market
system; (f) traditional industrial environment with technological capacities
allowing a fast absorption of foreign technology; (g) low transport costs;
proximity to major investing countries and good transport connections with
all Europe.
The main reason for a number of foreign firms has been the quality of the
Slovenian partner/target company -reliability, good managerial and other
staff expertise and tradition, solid production programme, export markets
and a successful previous cooperation with a Slovenian company. Thus,
company rather than country specific advantages are the major attraction
of Slovenia as an investment area.
b. Currency trade and convertibility
This area represents a substantial advance in the liberalization of foreign
exchange operations and its approach towards the regulations of the
developed European economical systems. The legislation framework of the
currency trade represents the following assignments:124
The foreign currency market also comprises all operations of buying and
selling foreign means of payment, which are transacted between
authorized banks and Slovenian Citizens, directly between authorized
banks, and between authorized banks and the Bank of Slovenia;
as a part of the bourse of money and capital, authorized banks can
establish currency bourse for trading with foreign payment means and it
is an independent legal entity;
the rate of exchange of foreign currency is freely formulated on the
basis of supply and demand on the foreign currency market;
the Bank of Slovenia operates on the foreign currency market trough the
intervention acquisition and sale of foreign currency and other means of
payment and thus it influences the formation of the rate of exchange;
exchange operations can be carried out by authorized banks and by other
people, who make a contract with an authorized bank on the transaction
of exchange operations;
foreign payment means can be sold or bought prompt or terminal;
the middle exchange rates of the foreign currencies are the indicators
of trade results and accounting of duty and other taxes. Currency bourse
calculates the middle exchange rates on the basis of reports of authorized
banks about concerning sellings and buyings of foreign payment means
and on the basis of the data referring to transactions on currency bourse,
thus determined by the Bank of Slovenia;125
execution of payments in foreign countries is free after the
reconciliation of all liabilities;
domestic legal subjects and individual proprietorships as a rule do not
hold foreign currency accounts, but rather the inflow of foreign currency
is paid out in the tolar countervalue. This system allows domestic legal
entities and individual proprietorships the right to buy foreign currency for
the payment of imports and other obligations abroad. Exceptions to the
basic principle are, however, anticipated, allowing domestic legal subjects
and individual proprietorships to receive payments from abroad for their
foreign currency accounts at domestic banks for the following purposes:
using advanced payments when making investment transactions abroad,
operations mediation, agency, forwarding trade and tourist agency
business, received registration fees, drawing on foreign currency from the
credits of international financial organizations, by means of which the
obligations of domestic consumers of credits are fulfilled towards foreign
transactions, which have obtained business in relation with the credits of
goods from consignment stocks on the basis of the foreign currency
shares of foreign parties in a domestic company;
Domestic subjects can hold these funds on foreign currency accounts
until the conclusion of deals, that is until the contract obligations
towards foreign subjects have been fulfilled or until the foreign currency
is spent for the purposes for which it was received;126
• citizens or foreign physical persons can hold foreign currency accounts
of foreign currency savings accounts with authorized banks; they have
free use of this foreign currency;
• it is explicitly permitted to use foreign currency and other international
measures of value as value foundations in contracts between domestic
persons ( the use of currency clause), whereby the obligations in these
cases are transacted in the domestic currency;
• the Executive Council of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia can
exceptionally pass temporary measures, but, only when the solvency of
the Republic is threatened, that is, when the measures of the Bank of
Slovenia do not achieve the expected results. These temporary measures
can last up to six months at the most (The Law on Foreign Exchange
Operations, 1991).
What has been done?
At the end of 1991 the monetary reform was carried out and a new monetary
unit, the Slovenian tolar (SIT) was introduced. We decided on a managed
floating rate of the tolar against the German mark because at that time we
did not have sufficient foreign exchange reserves. Last year the falling of the
exchange rate was smooth and it even started to increase. Foreign exchange
reserves were increasing all the time and we could say that in the
independent state of Slovenia we do not know what the lack of foreign
currencies means. The firms sell more currencies in the currency market than
they buy from banks. The current account has had surplus since the
independence (the estimation for 1994-the surplus exceeds US $ 0,5127
billion), while the trade balance has been in deficit. The foreign exchange
reserves already surpassed US $ 2,5 billion at the end of October last year,
due to the current account surplus and net inflow of the capital (indebtedness
for the construction of roads, railways, FDI, reimbursement of money from
foreign countries). Our state makes more than 60 % of GDP in foreign
countries (Gospodarski vestnik, Finance). The favourable situation with
regard to foreign exchange reserves already permits the introduction of full
convertibility for the tolar (till now it has been only internally convertible).
The tolar convertibility would require the relaxation of international currents
of capital and finance. But the Bank of Slovenia measure respecting
limitation of gaining loans in foreign countries, shows that Slovenia is not so
close to this. Until the Slovenian banking system is not able to compete
internationally we cannot talk about convertibility (Finance, 24.2.1995,
p. 2).
Thus foreign exchange reserves completely cover the foreign debt which
amounted to US $ 1,985 (1993) and provide 4 months of import coverage.
With 5,4 % debt service ratio Slovenia has absolutely no debt service
problems (Slovenia, 1994, p. 13). Li 1993 Slovenia signed an agreement
with the IMF fixing its share in the debt of the former Yugoslavia at 16,39
%. The same percentage was accepted by the Paris Club creditors. Slovenia
is prepared to take full responsibility for the so-called "allocated debt" (debt
contracted for the direct benefit of Slovenian entities) of about US $ 340
million and about US $ 170 million of unallocated debt (debt contracted for
general purposes by the former federal Yugoslavia). But commercial banks
in the London Club expect from Slovenia to assume responsibility for a total
of US $ 1,2 billion. Because of this lack of agreement the Slovenian
Government opened a special fiduciary account at the Dresdner Bank128
Luxembourg (US $ 88,7 was sent by the end of January 1995). The agreed
obligations to commercial banks will go into a special -account until an
agreement is reached with this group of borrowers regarding a solution
which will be satisfactory to both sides (Gospodarski vestnik, 23.2.1995,
no. 8, p. 5).
Relative liberal legislation encouraged some foreign banks to enter the
Slovenian financial market. Foreigners have the majority ownership in five
banks and 100 % ownership in one bank.
6.5. Labour force mobility
In the near past (40 to 50 years ago) there were large immigration flows
(economic immigrants) to Slovenia from other republics of ex-Yugoslavia.
Consequently, there is very a varied structure of population. The share of
non-Slovenian nationalities was increasing from census to census. At the
census in 1991 the share of all non-Slovenians in Slovenia was 12,16 % of
total population, and thereof 89 % immigrants from republics of ex-
Yugoslavia (what represents 10,8 % of the total population of the Republic
of Slovenia) (Results of the Census).
There are two ethnic minorities with special rights in Slovenia: Italian and
Hungarian, which together represent less than 1 % of the total population.
According to a research in this area migration movements were crucial for a
slow increase of the population in RS. In last years surplus of immigrated
above the emigrated residents of RS (average annual net migration in the
period from 1981 to 1991 was +3700) has been noticed. For RS immigrating129
is a very important factor of development and structure of population,
because in this way the demographic picture of Slovenia is changing by the
number, the age (more young residents) and nationality (Results of the
Research).
Slovenian citizens are free to choose an employment in foreign countries.
But foreigners need a work permits for working in Slovenia.
Requests for issuing work permits for foreigners are one of the elements
which show the variety of movements in the labour market. Last year the
institute issued more than 29.000 permits, 60 % of all cases represented
only renewals of those permits. It is bad that new permits were requested
primarily by workers with 1st. and Ilnd. grade of education. With a surplus
of workers with inappropriate education we primarily seek for cheap labour
(Gospodarski vestnik, 1995, no. 3).
Common restrictions for foreigners
Foreign workers need a work permit, on the base of which an employment
visa for the employment in RS at a Slovenian employer is issued. When
applying for an employment visa at the Institute for Employment foreigner
should enclose the evidence that he or she fulfils the common and special
conditions requested by the employer and that he/she is ready to accept the
employment if there is no other appropriate candidate with Slovenian
citizenship in evidence of the institute. Right after the independence were
offered permanent work permits, if they were employed on a permanent
basis in Slovenia and had been working in RS for at least ten years. To
candidates, who did not fulfil this condition, a work permit for one year was130
offered. Permit must be prolonged before falling due in order not to
interrupt the working relation (The Law on Employment Relations, 1990).
When a foreigner wants to work in a branch or an agency of a foreign firm
in Slovenia he should gain the business visa, which is valid also as the
permit for the temporary residence (Paper of Ministry of Economic
Relations and Development).131
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